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A TOXIC NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET: 
NEGLIGENCE AND THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S 




Imagine the new homebuyer who discovers soon after moving in 
that the hill across the street is a toxic landfill. lOr, imagine buying 
a house only to find that it is insulated with a substance that renders 
it unsuitable for occupation. 2 New homeowners in such situations 
face a number of possible problems. They may find that, due to toxic 
contamination, their newly bought houses are uninhabitable or un-
safe, or their properties' resale values have plummetted. 3 Addition-
ally, both the federal and many state governments require owners 
of contaminated property to pay for or contribute to the removal or 
cleanup of toxins. 4 Such clean-up costs can be astronomical. 5 To 
* Production Editor, 1987-88, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author would like to thank Jeffrey B. Renton for his guidance and advice. 
1 See, e.g., ATCO National Bank v. Jackson, No. C-3489-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed 
Aug. 15, 1983); Amended Complaint, Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty Co., No. 83-4485 (D. N.J. 
filed Nov. 22, 1983); Frank, Realty and Reality: Must Toxic Dump Be Revealed?, 71 A.B.A. 
J. 20, 20 (Apr. 1985) (citing ATCO National Bank v. Jackson) [hereinafter Realty and Reality]. 
2 Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, 531 A.2d 1125, 1128 (Pa. Super. 1987). 
3 See Realty and Reality, supra note 1, at 20 (homeowner offers a free Hawaiian vacation 
as inducement to selling his house); Amended Complaint, Cuzzupe, No. 83-4485 (for health 
and safety reasons, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development refused to authorize 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages in the area); Affidavit of William and 
Blanche Jackson, ATCO National Bank, No. C-3489-83. 
4 See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text. 
5 Cf. H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2835--37. Congress amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), for the purpose of, among other things, appropriating an additional 
$10 million to help clean up hazardous waste sites on the national priority list alone. I d. In 
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compound these problems, the buyer may have no recourse either 
against the creators of the pollution or against the sellers of the 
property, because the source of pollution is unknown,6 or the polluter 
is bankrupt. Furthermore, the seller may have been unaware of any 
contamination if the toxins were not manifest during the seller's 
ownership. The only recourse available to the residential real estate 
buyers in the situations described above, who find themselves own-
ers of contaminated property, is to seek recovery from the real estate 
brokers who sold them the land. 7 
Until the 1950s, purchasers of residential real estate had almost 
no recourse against real estate brokers for defects in the property 
sold. 8 Traditionally, the principle of caveat emptor, or buyer beware, 
shielded the sellers and brokers from liability for defective property. 9 
1980, Superfund allocated $1.6 bilion to clean up four hundred waste sites. Id. at 2836. In 
1986, the "total cost of completing the Superfund program is estimated to be as much as $100 
bilion." Id. at 2837. This cost includes the cleanup of industrial waste as well as of waste from 
"households [that] have disposed of solvents, paints and cleaning fluids." Id. These estimated 
costs only measure the amounts that the federal government will pay, and do not include 
contributions from private sources or from state governments. 
6 Telephone interview with John Fitzgerald, Director of the Division of Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Site Assessment and Clean-Up, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality 
Engineering-Woburn, Mass. (Nov. 7, 1986) [hereinafter Fitzgerald interview]. 
7 This Comment focuses on the liability of real estate brokers to purchasers, and thus does 
not concern the liability of sellers. This Comment is not a fifty-state survey on the status of 
real estate broker liability, as it varies from state to state. For a comprehensive compilation 
of case law on real estate broker liability in fraud, see, Annotation, Real Estate Broker's 
Liability To Purchaser For Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure of Physical Defects In Prop-
erty Sold, 46 A.L.R. 4TH 546 (1986). Nor will this Comment discuss the issues related to 
commercial real estate. Purchasers of commercial real estate are usually represented by their 
own brokers and are often more experienced and knowledgeable about real estate matters. 
Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102 n.8, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 n.8 (1984). Also, 
Congress has viewed commercial real estate sales as a different species of transactions from 
residential real estate. Congress recently created the innocent-landowner defense to liability 
under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607 (1982), when it passed the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613, 1616 (1986), § 101(0 (amending CERCLA §§ 9601(35)(A), 
9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Congress's view is expressed in the Conference Commit-
tee's statement that "those engaged in commercial [real estate] transactions should, however, 
be held to a higher standard [of due diligence to investigate for the presence of contamination] 
than those who are engaged in private residential transactions." Joint Explanatory Statement 
of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted 
in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3276,3279-80. 
8 Case Comment, Brokers-Real Estate Brokers' Duties to Prospective Purchasers-Funk V. 
Tifft, 1976 B. Y. U. L. REV. 513, 513 n.2. The rule of caveat emptor, "buyer beware," had for 
centuries governed the relationship between the buyer and the seller. Id. at 513-14. The same 
rule applied derivatively to the seller's agent, the real estate broker. Id. 
9Id. This principle protected brokers unless the purchaser could prove actionable fraud on 
the broker's part. 
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Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, buyers were required to in-
spect the property for sale, and were solely responsible if they failed 
to discover material defects. 10 Recently, however, the rule of caveat 
emptor has been eroding. ll Instead of adhering to the doctrine, 
courts have held that there is a sufficient relationship between real 
estate brokers and purchasers to allow purchasers a cause of action 
against the brokers independent of any liability on the sellers' part. 
Depending on the facts and circumstances, some courts have based 
this broker-buyer relationship in contract or agency law. 12 Many 
other courts have based a cause of action against brokers in tort for 
fraud. 13 Very recently, three courts have held that real estate bro-
kers can be liable to buyers in simple negligence. 14 
Tort law is the area experiencing the greatest expansion of broker 
liability to purchasers. 15 Over the past thirty years the duties of real 
estate brokers have broadened. Courts have begun to recognize that 
caveat emptor could not insulate brokers from liability to a purchaser 
when they commit fraud. 16 Today in most states, brokers can be held 
liable to a purchaser for damages arising from their fraudulent state-
ments because purchasers are often justified in relying on real estate 
brokers' statements. 17 Furthermore, some state courts have held 
\0 See generally Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging 
Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 767 (1978). 
11 Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala. 1977); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 
(Utah 1980) ("In this state ... the rule of caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing with 
licensed real estate brokers."). See, e.g., Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 
164, 165-66, 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (1981) ("Caveat emptor applies to sales of real estate 
relative to conditions open to observation.") (emphasis included) (citing Traverse v. Long, 165 
Ohio St. 249, 135 N.E.2d 256 (1956)); Case Comment, supra note 8, at 513 n.2. 
12 See infra notes 33-57 and accompanying text. 
13 See generally Romero, supra note 10; Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 
Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984). See also infra notes 78-137 and accompanying text. 
14 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383; Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person 
Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (1984); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1986). 
15 See generally Romero, supra note 10. 
16 Initially the broker was held liable for concealment of a defect or fraudulent misrepre-
sentation on which the buyer relied in making a decision to purchase the property. See Case 
Comment, supra note 8, at 514. A broker's misrepresentation, coupled with the buyer's 
reliance, was sufficient grounds for overlooking caveat emptor, even though the buyer could 
have discovered the defect by his own investigations. Miles v. McSwengin, 58 Ohio St. 2d 97, 
101, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1370 (1979). 
17 Case Comment, supra note 8, at 514. See also Fausett & Co. v. Bullard, 217 Ark. 176, 
179, 229 S. W.2d 490, 491 (1950) ("[TJhe doctrine of caveat emptor . .. has not been applied 
inflexibly to every situation . . . . [TJhere are many circumstances that justify the buyer in 
acting upon the seller's statements .... "); Spargnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82, 84-5 (D.C. 
1954) (caveat emptor not applied in case of fraudulent misrepresentation); Keith v. Wilder, 
241 N.C. 672, 676, 86 S.E.2d 444,447 (1955) (caveat emptor not applied to case of fraudulent 
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real estate brokers to the professional standard of care enunciated 
in their real estate licensing laws and found the brokers liable in 
fraud for failing to behave according to those standards. 18 Beginning 
with fraud, the decline of the caveat emptor shield has resulted in a 
broker duty in most jurisdictions to conduct themselves in an ethical, 
competent manner, and to disclose material defects to purchasers. 19 
The real estate duty based in fraud, however, requires brokers to 
disclose only defects about which they know, and about which the 
buyers are unaware. 20 Brokers must reveal known information, or 
information about which they should have known. Independent of 
any such disclosures, it is generally not the brokers' responsibility 
to inspect the property for signs of defects such as those of hazard-
ous-substance contamination. 21 Such signs are often subtle and can-
not be discovered without investigation. 22 
Under present law in most jurisdictions, where brokers need only 
mention those defects about which they are or should be aware, they 
have no incentive to make an additional inspection for toxic pollution 
or to question sellers about it. Though toxic contamination is impor-
tant to a buyer's decision, such a defect-of which even the seller 
may be unconscious-will remain undetected. As a result, sellers 
and brokers, who are in the best position to know the property, will 
receive prices and commissions that do not reflect these defects and 
that are thus artificially high. Meanwhile, buyers alone bear the 
burden of risk that the property may be contaminated. Brokers are 
licensed by the states, and are expected to perform their jobs com-
petently and honestly on behalf of the public. If licensed brokers, 
who are familiar with the vagaries of residential real estate, are not 
required to inspect for this sort of defect, they will not be fulfilling 
a duty to the public as defined by the licensing laws. More important, 
an opportunity to discover environmental contamination, which is a 
significant national objective, is overlooked if there is no incentive 
to inspect. 
In three jurisdictions, however, an additional step in the decline 
of caveat emptor has occurred and it can help the buyer of con tam-
misrepresentation); First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc., 19 Wash. 
App. 275, 279 n.2, 574 P.2d 1211, 1214 n.2 (1978) (caveat emptor does not shield broker from 
liability to buyer for fraudulent misrepresentation). 
18 See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 42-137 and accompanying text. 
20 Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1984). 
21 See generally infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
22 See, e.g., Fitzgerald interview, supra note 6. 
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inated property. In 1984, the California Superior Court in Easton v. 
Strassburger23 established that a real estate broker may be held 
liable in simple negligence for failure affirmatively to inspect sale-
property for defects and failure to disclose those defects to the 
purchaser. 24 Under the E aston negligence theory, real estate brokers 
owe buyers a duty to investigate for and reveal information about 
defects in the property they sell. This duty would encourage inspec-
tion of sale property for toxic contamination. 25 Two other state courts 
have followed Easton. 26 Whereas real estate brokers once enjoyed 
relatively unbridled freedom, there is precedent for replacing caveat 
emptor's protection of real estate brokers with a broker duty owed 
to purchasers in tort, and particularly in simple negligence. This 
precedent exists despite the still-recognized fact that, in residential 
real estate sales, the broker is the seller's agent and owes the seller 
a duty of allegiance. 27 
Thus far, only three states, California, New Mexico and Utah have 
advanced the law of real estate brokers beyond fraud to simple 
negligence by establishing an affirmative duty to buyers to investi-
gate the property for material defects. 28 This Comment proposes 
that state law ought to hold real estate brokers liable to buyers in 
simple negligence for breaching a duty to investigate reasonably and 
disclose indications of possible toxic contamination on residential real 
estate. Those states that have not yet done so should adopt the 
standard of care enunciated in Easton v. Strassburger. 29 Toward this 
end, this Comment analyzes the Easton decision, and argues that 
the Easton court was correct in holding that real estate brokers can 
2:l Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383. 
24 Id. at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. 
25 Cf. id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390; Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, 513 A.2d 1125, 
1128 (Pa. Super. 1987) (where seller did not know the type of insulation in the house except 
that it was "blown into the walls," and broker did not investigate further, broker failed to 
disclose presence of urea formaldehyde). 
26 Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 576, 686 P.2d 262, 
266 (1984); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986). Additionally, real estate brokers 
have been held to standards stricter than those in simple negligence. See generally Romero, 
supra note 10. For an argument that brokers can be held to an even higher duty to buyers, 
see Fossey & Roston, The Broker's Liability In a Real Estate Transaction: Bad News and 
Good News For Defense Attorneys, 12 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 37 (1982-83) (arguing that 
decision in Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982) holds real estate brokers strictly 
liable for misrepresentations communicated in the real estate transaction). 
" See Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 706, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1980). 
2H See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383; Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person 
Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (1984); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1986). 
29 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383. 
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be liable in negligence. The first section sets out the legal precedent 
for the real estate broker duty in negligence. The second section 
explains the negligence standard as the Easton court and its adher-
ents have employed it. The next section then demonstrates that the 
Easton holding is the natural and implicit result of the precedent 
found in real estate broker law. Adopting the real estate broker's 
negligence standard, easily applied to inspections for signs of toxic 
pollution, requires no significant additional expertise on the part of 
competent brokers. Finally, by imposing the rule and theory of 
Easton, courts could promote the national goal of discovering and 
cleaning up toxic pollution. 30 To this end, the Comment's last section 
explains the advantages of employing this standard of care in light 
of the national goal of identifying and cleaning up toxic contamination 
of the environment. 
II. NEGLIGENCE AND THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S DUTY OF 
CARE-PRECEDENT FOR THE DECISION IN EASTON 
V. STRASSBURGER 
A. Agency Law and the Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duty to 
Buyers 
In the typical residential real estate transaction, the broker is not 
a neutral party.31 Rather, an agency relationship forms between the 
seller and the broker. Either they enter into a listing agreement,32 
30 See generally Clean Air Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982); Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, and amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982); Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 960l-
9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide al).d Rodenticide Act, 7 
U.S.C. §§ 135-136y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
31 Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 269 (Ala. 1977). 
32 Romero, supra note 10, at 769. The listing agreement is the contract between the buyer 
and seller in which the terms spell out, among other things, the property, the terms and price 
of the sale. Id. at 769 n.18. There are a number of possible arrangements under the listing 
agreement. Among them is the "exclusive listing," under which the listing broker has the 
exclusive right to show and sell the property. Id. at 769-70. There is also the "multiple listing" 
or "open listing" in which, through publication, other brokers in the area obtain access to the 
listing, or the property's description. Id. at 771; Currey v. Kornack, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 
13, 1978), aJJ'd, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1978) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). According 
to both custom and the terms of the multilisting contract, in the multiple listing or cooperative 
transaction both the listing broker and the selling broker (the broker who makes the sale) 
share the commission. Romero, supra note 10, at 771. See also Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 13, 1978), aJJ'd, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1978) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
Under this second method, the selling broker is deemed a subagent: agent of the listing 
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or the seller hires the broker to find a purchaser and is the one who 
pays the broker's commission. 33 Whether express or implied, the 
resulting agency relationship imposes on the broker all of the re-
sponsibilities and liabilities that agents owe their principals. 34 As 
their principals' agents, brokers owe sellers a duty of undivided 
loyalty, due care, and expertise. 35 The broker's and seller's interests 
are naturally allied since the higher the selling price and the quicker 
the sale, the larger the broker's commission and the sooner it is 
collected. 36 
In this agency relationship between broker and seller, purchasers 
are viewed as third parties, and thus have no privity or legal rela-
tionship with the broker.37 Some courts see this arrangement as the 
reason for refusing to hold brokers liable to purchasers for the breach 
of any duty under the listing agreement. 38 To hold otherwise means 
that brokers could be legally responsible to both parties. This would 
create a conflict for brokers, since buyers and sellers have opposing 
interests: "the seller wants to receive the highest possible price. . . . 
[while] the buyer wants to purchase the property at the lowest 
possible price."39 Any defects and weaknesses in the property which 
brokers bring to the purchasers' attention are used as leverage to 
negotiate a lower price. What works to the buyers' advantage works 
broker, who in turn is agent of the seller. Romero, supra note 10, at 771; Currey, No. 5436 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), aff'd, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1978) (LEXIS, States library, Del 
file); cf. Maxwell v. Ratcliffe, 356 Mass. 560, 562, 254 N.E.2d 250, 252 (1969). 
3:3 Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 270 (Ala. 1977). 
34 Romero, supra note 10, at 771, 773-79; Comment, Real Estate Brokers Liability for 
Failure to Disclose: A New Duty to Investigate, 17 PAC. L.J. 327, 329 (1985) (discussing the 
broker's duty as being the "equivalent of a trustee's duty to a beneficiary .... [The duty isJ 
stringent .... "). 
35 Romero, supra note 10, at 771, 773-79; Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 706-07, 
615 P.2d 1305, 1309-10 (1980); Cashion, 345 So. 2d at 270 ("A broker employed to sell property 
has the specific duty ... to effect a sale to the best advantage of the principal-that is, on 
best terms and at the best price possible.") (citing 12 AM. JUR. 2D, Brokers, § 96 (1962)); cf. 
First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 279, 574 
P.2d 1211, 1214-15 (1978) (broker, as seller's agent, owes seller duties arising from that 
agency). Non-listing real estate agents and salesmen are also responsible to the principal as 
subagents of the listing agent. Romero, supra note 10, at 772. 
36 See generally Romero, supra note 10; Comment, supra note 34, at 331 ("[TJhe broker 
has [aJ separate and distinct self-interest in completing the sale and earning a commission."). 
37 Cf. Romero, supra note 10, at 778. "Only the principal may recover from the agent for 
breach of the agent's duty since certain duties owed to the principal ... are not owed to the 
third party ... in the transaction." Id. (footnote omitted). 
38 Id. 
39 Comment, supra note 34, at 331. "Inherent in the dual agency ... is a conflict of interest 
for the broker. The two principals have competing interests that the broker must attempt to 
reconcile." I d. (footnotes omitted). 
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to the sellers' disadvantage. Thus, if they are liable to buyers, bro-
kers would find themselves in the conflicting position of the dual 
agent: having two masters.40 For this reason, buyers have tradition-
ally had no grounds for recovery against brokers for any harm 
suffered due to the brokers' actions. 41 
Recently, however, courts have begun to find brokers liable to 
buyers for breach of a fiduciary duty despite the lack of contractual 
privity or of any traditional agency relationship.42 Courts have used 
two rationales to support this conclusion. First, brokers provide an 
actual service to buyers in real estate transactions. A more intimate 
relationship may develop between them than between brokers and 
sellers. Brokers and buyers spend many hours together, discussing 
the buyers' needs and tastes, engaging in confidential interviews, 
exchanging ideas, seeking advice and searching for just the right 
house. 43 In contrast, sellers and brokers may see each other only 
once to sign the listing agreement. 44 It is not surprising then that 
buyers may believe that brokers are actually working for them. 45 
Brokers are also professionals and not laymen. 46 Buyers rely on 
real estate brokers for substantial guidance because of the brokers' 
superior knowledge, experience and skill in the area of residential 
real estate. 47 Realizing that purchasers have placed their trust in 
40 Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala. 1977) ("A servant cannot have two mas-
ters. "). Although real estate brokers may be agents for both buyer and seller in the sale, they 
may become liable if they act as dual agents without full disclosure to both parties. Id.; 
Comment, supra note 34, at 331 ("The conflicts . .. are acute if the broker has not fully 
disclosed the nature of the dual agency relationship and the principals are unaware of the 
broker's divided loyalties. "). 
41 See Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 97, 25 So. 2d 4, 4 (1946) ("Generally speaking an agent is 
responsible only to his principal."). 
42 First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275,279, 
574 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1978) (although listing broker is seller's agent, he may also be liable to 
third parties); see also Case Comment, supra note 8, at 513-14. 
43 Romero, supra note 10, at 772-73. 
44 Id. Sales agents may never and need never meet each other though they may share 
information. See, e.g., Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 
574, 577, 686 P.2d 262, 264, 267 (1984). In fact, the selling broker need never meet the sellers 
and the listing broker need never meet the buyers. See, e.g., Currey v. Kornack, No. 5436 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978) afi'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
45 See Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1980); see, e.g., Currey v. Kornack, No. 
5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978) (LEXIS, States library, Del file); cf. Romero, supra note 10, at 
772-73. 
46 Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1248 ("[AJ real estate broker ... does not occupy the position of a 
lay-vendor of property."); see also Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 483-85, 412 N.W.2d 438, 
442-43 (1987) (Caporale, J., concurring) (citing twenty-four cases from many states supporting 
the proposition that real estate brokers are professionals). 
47 Comment, Expansion of a Real Estate Broker's Duties: Is Easton v. Strassburger in 
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brokers, some courts have held that brokers should deal fairly and 
honestly with purchasers.48 Therefore, those courts which have rec-
ognized the buyers' trust in brokers, and have imposed on brokers 
an obligation to conduct themselves fairly and competently on behalf 
of buyers, have actually imposed on real estate brokers a standard 
of behavior as a fiduciary to buyers based on the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. 49 
The courts' second rationale for brokers' fiduciary duty to buyers 
arises from state laws regulating real estate brokers. These statutes 
recognize that because brokers deal with the public they are con-
cerned with public interest. 50 For example, one court determined 
that the state Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen's Act is "affected 
with public interest" because it was enacted to protect the public at 
large from the "unscrupulous" real estate broker. 51 In many states, 
real estate brokers must demonstrate a certain level of knowledge 
and competence to obtain a license to practice. 52 These licensing 
requirements serve as the applicable standard of care and level of 
skill against which brokers may be measured. 53 Licensing statutes 
are also seen as imposing a duty on brokers to act honestly and 
competently toward buyers in particular. 54 One court has aptly char-
Illinois' Future?, 1984 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 97, 104; Case Note, Broker Can Be Held Liable 
For Negligent Misrepresentation To Vendee, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 229, 230; Tennant v. Lawton, 
26 Wash. App. 701, 706, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1980) (reason for broker duty to buyer, who is 
not principal, is broker as professional is in position to verify information from seller). 
48 See Comment, supra note 47, at 103. 
49 See Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 232, 647 P.2d 433,434 (1982); see also 
Sinclair, The Duty of the Broker to Purchasers and Prospective Purchasers of Real Property 
in Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260 (Jan. 1981). 
50 McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 175,646 P.2d 771,774 (1982), afI'd, 101 Wash. 2d 
161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984); Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 239 Kan. 324, 330, 720 P.2d 660, 
666 (1986). Cf. Pride Mark Realty v. Mullins, 30 Md. App. 497,499,352 A.2d 866,867 (1976). 
For a discussion of the differences between the "public interest" and "fiduciary duty" ap-
proaches to analyzing the buyer-broker relationship, see Case Comment, supra note 8. 
51 McRae, 32 Wash. App. at 175, 646 P.2d at 774, afI'd, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 646 P. 2d 496. 
52 Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). Sinclair, supra note 49. 
53 See, e.g., Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-29-1-69-29-29 
(1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2124 (1986). Section 10(B) of the New Mexico statute 
requires brokers to demonstrate in a written exam, among other things, a knowledge of 
business ethics and general provisions of the statute relating to brokers and salesmen. N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 61-29-1-69-29-29 (1978). Brokers in Arizona must pass an exam which includes 
questions on the general purpose and legal effect of agency contracts. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 32-2124 (1986). Sinclair, supra note 49. 
54 Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 97, 25 So. 2d 4, 4 (1946); Pride Mark Realty, 30 Md. App. at 
499,352 A.2d at 867; Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 232-33, 647 P.2d 433,434 
(1982); Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1248; McRae, 32 Wash. App. at 175, 646 P.2d at 774, afI'd, 101 
Wash. 2d 161, 646 P.2d 496 (1984). But, some courts have strained to find a fiduciary rela-
tionship. Case Comment, supra note 8, at 518. 
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acterized the duty as somewhere between caveat emptor and strict 
fiduciary duty: one of "honest, ethical and competent behavior, ... 
answerable at law for breaches of statutory duty" to the purchasers 
and to the public. 55 Hence, the public interest is the paramount force 
behind some courts' conclusions that, despite the lack of a formal 
agency relationship between brokers and buyers, brokers must 
maintain a standard of behavior of good faith and fair dealing, as 
dictated by the licensing requirements. Buyers may sue brokers who 
breach this standard. 56 
In states that approach the real estate broker responsibility 
through the law of fiduciaries, the duty to disclose arises when 
circumstances are such that failure to disclose would violate ethical 
standards to act in good faith, competently, and with a level of skill 
mandated by the state licensing scheme. 57 This duty includes disclo-
sure of material facts and information known or knowable58 to the 
broker-but not to the purchaser-that affect the value and desir-
ability of the sale property. 59 
There is precedent, therefore, for holding real estate brokers liable 
to purchasers for breach of a kind of fiduciary duty. Originally the 
brokers' duties were clearly defined: they were the sellers' agent 
and only owed sellers a duty in agency. Today in some jurisdictions, 
neither the absence of an agency relationship with the buyer, nor 
the brokers' fiduciary duties in agency to sellers, may insulate real 
estate brokers any 10nger. 6o Rather, some courts allow buyers re-
55 See Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1248. 
56 Sinclair, supra note 49, at 266; Zichlin, 157 Fla. at 98, 25 So. 2d at 4. 
57 Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1248; Pride Mark Realty, 30 Md. App. at 499 n.1, 352 A.2d at 867 
n.1 (Maryland code allows revocation of real estate broker's license for failure to disclose 
material facts.); McRae, 32 Wash. App. at 175, 646 P.2d at 774, aff'd, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 646 
P.2d 496 (1984) (Washington licensing scheme heavily regulates the real estate industry to 
protect public from unscrupulous brokers and requires broker to disclose facts.). 
58 Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 239 Kan. 324, 332, 720 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1986) (broker 
liable under statute for failing to disclose what he knew or should have known). 
59 Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1249; Pride Mark Realty, 30 Md. App. at 499 n.1, 352 A.2d at 867 
n.l. Such a statutory duty to disclose may even be more strict than the seller's concomitant 
duty. Johnson, 239 Kan. at 332, 720 P.2d at 666 (statute places higher duty on broker to 
disclose flaw about which broker knew or should have known even when seller was not liable, 
because brokers are experts and public relies on them). Comment, Real Estate Broker's 
Liability for Failure to Disclose: A New Duty to Investigate, 17 PAC. L.J. 327, 331 (1985) 
("[f]iduciary duty of the broker encompasses several duties, the most important aspect is the 
duty of disclosure."). Cf. McRae, 32 Wash. App. at 175-77, 646 P.2d at 774-75, aff'd, 101 
Wash.2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984). For a thorough discussion of what constitutes materiality, 
see infra note 92. 
60 Johnson, 239 Kan. at 332, 720 P.2d at 666 (broker can be liable to purchaser even when 
seller in transaction is not). 
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course against real estate brokers for the breach of their duty of 
loyalty and honesty to conduct themselves in an ethical and compe-
tent manner and to disclose material defects. 61 Liability for betraying 
the buyer's reliance on the realities of the buyer-broker relations, 
or for violating the ethical standard of the broker-licensing laws, is 
the beginning of the development of the brokers' duty in negligence. 
This fiduciary duty to disclose, then, is a precursor to the Easton 
court's duty in simple negligence. 
B. Tort Law-Fraud as Antecedent to the Real Estate Broker's 
Duty to Buyers in Simple Negligence 
Case law has established a real estate broker's duty to disclose 
information to buyers. 62 Although the law of broker liability has 
evolved at different rates across the country, today brokers almost 
universally owe buyers a duty to disclose material facts not reason-
ably noticeable to the purchaser, but observable to brokers or about 
which brokers are aware. 63 Historically, the duty to disclose material 
facts originated in fraud. 64 Because of the absence of a contract and 
thus privity between brokers and buyers, any broker liability would 
have had to lie not on the contract, but in tort. 65 
The broker's tort liability in fraud to buyers for breaching the 
duty of disclosure may arise in one of three situations. First, brokers 
61 See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text. 
62 Brokers must make truthful representations or disclosures. Currey v. Kornack, No. 5436 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978) aff'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 14, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
"If an agent cannot truthfully answer an inquiry regarding the property ... he should frankly 
admit his lack of knowledge." Id. (emphasis added). Prior to the decision in Easton v. 
Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984), California law had established 
that the broker must disclose material defects known to the broker but unknown to the buyer. 
152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (citing Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 
866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976) and Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 733, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 201, 203 (1963)). 
63 See, e.g., Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204; Cooper, 56 Cal. App. 
3d at 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 727; Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 265, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 
131-32 (1983); Spargnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82, 83 (D.C. 1954); Foust v. Valleybrook 
Realty Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 164, 164-65, 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1124 (1981); Miles v. McSwengin, 
58 Ohio St. 2d 97, 101, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1370 (1979); see generally, Annotation, Real Estate 
Broker's Liability for Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure of Physical Defects in Property 
Sold, 46 A.L.R. 4TH 546 (1986). 
64 Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 737-38, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 206. 
65 See generally Romero, supra note 10, at 770-79; Rayner v. Wise Realty Co. of Tallahas-
see, 504 So. 2d 1361, 1365 (Fla. App. 1987) ("As is" provision in contract for sale will not 
necessarily function as a defense to liability in fraud) (citing Annotation, Construction and 
Effect of Provision in Contract for Sale of Realty by Which Purchaser Agrees to Take Property 
"As Is" or in the Condition in Which It Is, 97 A.L.R. 2D 849 (1964)). 
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can be liable for making a fraudulent misrepresentation in order to 
mislead buyers,66 or to prevent buyers from discovering a material 
defect. 67 This is fraud by commission. Second, brokers can be re-
sponsible to buyers for pecuniary damages resulting from an act of 
omission for concealment or nondisclosure of a defect. 68 In such cases, 
brokers, by their non-action, failed to inform the buyers of a material 
defect. 69 Third, many courts have adopted section 552 of the Res-
tatement of Torts which states in part, "[o]ne who ... supplies false 
information is . . . liab[le] . . . if he fails to exercise reasonable care 
or competence in obtaining or communicating that information. "70 
Those courts will hold brokers liable for negligent misrepresentation, 
that is, negligently making a false statement.71 Thus, by relying on 
a cause of action in tort for either fraudulent misrepresentation, 
fraudulent concealment, or for negligent misrepresentation, pur-
chasers have been able to recover from brokers even in the absence 
of any contractual or fiduciary duty. 72 
1. The Broker's Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
A fraudulent misrepresentation of a defect occurs when a broker 
makes an active misstatement designed to conceal material defects 
in the property for sale. 73 This is a tort of commission or malfeasance 
in which the broker has made a positive misrepresentation with the 
intention to mislead or deceive the buyer.74 When brokers know of 
defects and consequently of the falsity oftheir statements, they have 
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977); see infra notes 73-79 and accompanying 
text. 
67 See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. 
6S RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1977); see infra notes 86-93 and accompanying 
text. 
69 See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text. 
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
71 Id.; see infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. This Comment does not address an 
additional possible cause of action for innocent misrepresentation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 552C(l) (1977). For a thorough discussion of that theory ofliability, see Comment, 
Realtor Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation and Undiscovered Defects: Balancing the 
Equities Between Broker and Buyer, 20 VAL. V.L. REV. 255 (1986). 
72 First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 279 
n.2, 574 P.2d 1211, 1214 n.2 (1978). The court rejected the defendant listing broker's arguments 
that since he was the seller's agent he owed no duty to the buyer, and held that, despite the 
lack of fiduciary relationship, the listing broker is "nevertheless liable to a third party for 
misrepresentation of boundary lines .... " Id. at 279, 574 P.2d at 1214. See also Johnson v. 
Geer Real Estate Co., 239 Kan. 324, 332, 720 P.2d 660, 665 (1986) (broker can be liable for 
own fraud when seller is not); infra note 11l. 
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
74 Keith v. Wilder, 241 N.C. 672, 675, 86 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1955). 
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scienter,75 that is, knowledge or intent to deceive. 76 Real estate 
agents can be liable for fraud if they make remarks in response to 
specific inquiries by the purchasers. 77 Some courts have held brokers 
liable for making misleading implications or statements upon which 
buyers have relied. 78 When brokers make statements in order to 
prevent buyers from learning the truth or to deceive them about the 
state of affairs, courts have found liability. 79 
Brokers have been held liable to buyers for misrepresentations 
whether or not the brokers knew the statements to be false. 80 For 
example, one court found that, had the real estate broker checked 
before representing that the house's heating system was in perfect 
working order, the broker would have discovered the seller's at-
tempts to conceal major flaws. 81 Thus, an affirmative, but false rep-
resentation with the intent to deceive the buyer can lead to broker 
liability regardless of whether the broker currently knew of its 
falsity. 
75 See, e.g., McGerr v. Beals, 180 Neb. 767, 778, 145 N.W.2d 579, 582 (1966) (knowing it to 
be false, broker told buyer basement does not flood); Loch Ridge Construction Co. v. Barra, 
291 Ala. 312, 318-19, 280 So. 2d 745, 750 (1973) (knowing it to be false, broker told buyer 
building was constructed under Veteran's Administration and FHA specifications and was in 
perfect condition). 
76 W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 (5th ed. 1984). 
77 Loch Ridge Construction Co., 291 Ala. at 315-16, 280 So. 2d at 747. 
7" Keith, 241 N.C. at 673-74, 86 S.E.2d at 445-46. In Keith, the agent showed the buyer 
the parcel of land in question, "pointing out its boundaries," when in fact he was indicating 
land owned by someone other than the seller. The North Carolina Supreme Court found that 
the statement was false and calculated to induce the purchase. [d. See also Berryman v. 
Reigert, 286 Minn. 270, 274, 175 N. W.2d 438,441 (1970) (In response to buyer's apprehensions 
about flooding problems, the broker replied "[Alfter the rains we have had here, if there is 
no water here now there never should be any," though past history of flooding was information 
accessible to broker). 
79 See, e.g., MeG err , 180 Neb. at 770-71, 145 N.W.2d at 582 (knowing it to be false, broker 
said rain water draining from east would empty into street rather than basement and there 
was no threat of basement flooding); Romero, supra note lO, at 782; W. KEETON, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § lO7 (5th ed. 1984); Loch Ridge Construction Co., 291 
Ala. at 320-21, 280 So. 2d at 752 (when buyer specifically asked whether house was built 
according to FHA specifications, saleswoman said it was, even though she knew it was not). 
so Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963) (holding 
broker "jointly and severally liable with the seller for the full amount of the damages as a 
party connected to the fraud" for relaying seller's false statements); Spargnapani v. Wright, 
110 A.2d 82, 83-84 (D.C. 1954); Maxwell v. Ratcliffe, 356 Mass. 560, 562, 254 N.E.2d 250, 
252 (1969) (broker liable for false statements where he knew or should have known of falsity); 
Keith, 241 N.C. at 676, 86 S.E.2d at 447 (Despite brokers' claim of ignorance as to correct 
boundaries, because buyers relied on brokers' statements as to property's boundaries, court 
refused to reverse jury finding of fraud.); Romero, supra note lO, at 782. But see Provost v. 
Miller, 144 Vt. 67, 69-70, 473 A.2d 1162, 1163-64 (1984) (agent not liable for principal's or 
another agent's misrepresentation as to defect unless agent knew or should have known of 
it). 
HI Spargnapani, 110 A.2d at 83-84. 
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Sometimes it is enough to make out a case of fraud if brokers, 
while seeking to mislead,82 make assertions even though they either 
know there is no basis for their statements, or they simply have no 
confidence in the statements' accuracy.83 In the former case, although 
they may not actually have known it was false, if brokers recklessly 
assumed the given information was true, then courts have deemed 
them to have committed a fraudulent misstatement. 84 In the latter 
case, when brokers knew that they were unaware of the truth, but 
made assertions that turned out to be false, those assertions, if made 
with intent to mislead, are fraudulent misrepresentations. 85 A finding 
of liability in fraud, therefore, necessarily implies that the broker 
either knowingly failed to disclose information truthfully, or know-
ingly disclosed information of which the veracity is in doubt. The 
consequential responsibility of the broker is truthfully to disclose 
material information, or risk liability for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion. To protect themselves then, brokers must at least verify their 
principals' statements before conveying them. 
2. The Broker's Nondisclosure-Fraudulent Concealment 
Whereas fraudulent misrepresentation is a tort involving disclo-
sure, concealment is a tort involving nondisclosure. Under the law 
of fraudulent nondisclosure, real estate brokers are liable for inten-
tionally witholding, suppressing, preventing others from acquiring, 
or failing to disclose a material fact when it causes pecuniary loss to 
others.86 Effectively, the broker's nondisclosure of a fact "amounts 
to a representation of the nonexistence of the fact. "87 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). 
&l RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (a)-(c), comment f (1977); Keith, 241 N.C. at 
675,86 S.E.2d at 446; Spargnapani, 110 A.2d at 84 ("fraud indicates the pretense of knowledge 
when knowledge there is none") (quoting Uitramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 
N.E. 441, 444 (1931)). 
84 Hammond v. Matthes, 109 Mich. App. 352, 359-60, 311 N.W.2d 357, 360-61 (1981); Keith, 
241 N.C. at 675, 86 S.E.2d at 446. 
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526b comment e (1977); Fausett & Co. v. Bullard, 
217 Ark. 176, 179, 229 S. W.2d 490, 491 (1950). 
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 550 and 551 (1977). Section 550 states: "One party 
to a transaction who by concealment or other action intentionally prevents the other from 
acquiring material information is subject to the same liability ... for pecuniary loss as though 
he had stated the nonexistence of the matter .... " See also Maples v. Porath, 638 S.W.2d 
337, 337-40 (Mo. App. 1982) (citing "substantial and impressive out-state authority," court 
established broker liability to buyer for nondisclosure of a material fact). See Lingsch v. 
Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1963); Annotation, Real Estate 
Broker's Liability to Purchaser For Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure of Physical Defects 
In Property Sold, 46 A.L.R. 4TH 546 (1986). 
87 Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
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Three conditions together create a broker's legal duty to disclose 
information to buyers:88 first, the broker possesses or has access to 
information;89 second, the broker knows such information is unknown 
to the buyer;90 third, the facts are material. 91 A material defect is 
one that affects the property's value or desirability and therefore 
influences the purchaser's decision to buy.92 If a fact is material, the 
OF TORTS § 551 (1977)); see also Currey v. Kornack, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978) aff'd, 
No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) ("[T]here has been an inadvertent 
nondisclosure, and thus, a misrepresentation .... "). 
S8 Cf. Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204 ("[W]hile such a duty [to 
disclose] may arise from a fiduciary or other confidential relationship ... such relationship 
obtains in the case at bench and the duty of disclosure must therefore arise from other 
circumstances."); Rayner v. Wise Realty Co. of Tallahassee, 504 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (Fla. App. 
1987) (citing Johnson v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)); Romero, supra 
note 10, at 780. The elements of a cause of action for nondisclosure are the same as those 
necessary for a showing of misrepresentation. Id. Though the number varies among states, 
the essential elements for a cause of action against a broker are: 1) a broker misrepresented 
or did not disclose a material fact that affects the value or desirability of the property; 2) the 
broker had knowledge of the falsity of the representation or withheld information; 3) the 
purchaser'S ignorance of the falsity; 4) the broker intended to induce the purchaser to buy; 
5) the misrepresentation or nondisclosure induced the purchaser to act; and 6) the purchaser 
suffered damages as a result of the misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Romero, supra note 
7, at 780 (emphasis added). 
89 Treece & Mead, Real Estate Brokers: A Duty to Investigate?, 27 FOR THE DEF. 16, 17 
(Apr. 1985); Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735--37, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204-06; Rayner, 504 So. 
2d at 1364 (seller's duty to disclose all known facts materially affecting property's value which 
are not known or readily observable to buyer applied to seller's broker). 
9() Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735--38, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204-07. 
91 Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, 531 A.2d 1125, 1130--31 (Pa. Super. 1987). ("Under the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550, the concealment ... must relate to material infor-
mation."); Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 773-78, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204-07. (The court first 
defined this as the seller's duty, and then asserted that the seller's broker is under the same 
duty of disclosure as the seller.). See also Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 265, 193 Cal. 
Rptr. 130, 131 (1983) (whether seller has duty to disclose depends on materiality of facts in 
question). 
92 Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 738, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 206; cf. McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. 
App. 173, 176-77, 646 P.2d 771, 774 (1982), afi'd, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984); 
Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976). A material fact is 
also defined as a fact "that relates to matters of substance and [is] of such importance as to 
influence the actions of the party to whom it is represented to be true." Currey v. Kornack, 
No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978) aff'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, 
Del file). 
Some of the characteristics of residential property which have been found to be material to 
a purchaser's decision to buy, and that give rise to the broker's duty to disclose are: that 
there be no urea formaldehyde foam insulation (UFFI) in the house, Roberts v. Estate of 
Barbagallo, 531 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1987); that the house be built according to plans 
and specifications approved by the Veterans Administration and FHA, Loch Ridge Construc-
tion Co. v. Barra, 291 Ala. 312, 315-16, 280 So. 2d 745, 747 (1973); that there is a U.S. 
Department of Agriculture quarantine on the property due to a noxious weed, Elder v. 
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379,381,384 P.2d 802,803 (1963); that the building had been condemned, 
Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 732--33, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 203; whether there is "anything wrong 
with the property," McRae, 32 Wash. App. at 174, 646 P.2d at 773, ajJ'd, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 
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broker should bring it to the buyer's attention or risk liability to the 
buyer for nondisclosure. 93 
Central to a finding of nondisclosure is the broker's knowledge of 
the concealed defect and of the buyer's ignorance of it. 94 In litigation, 
the buyer must show not only that the broker knew of the facts in 
question but that the broker knew these facts were unknown to or 
beyond reach of the buyer.95 Thus; the brokers' scienter, i.e. fraud-
ulent conduct, lies in the suppression of material facts that the 
brokers know about or that are accessible only to them and that are 
beyond the reach of the diligent buyer.96 To avoid liability in nondis-
closure then, brokers must affirmatively determine-on behalf of 
buyers-what information is at their disposal, whether it is material 
to the buyers' decision, and then disclose those flaws that buyers 
cannot themselves reasonably ascertain.97 
While the general rule requires brokers to disclose only currently 
known facts, brokers have been held liable for nondisclosure of a 
646 P. 2d 496 (1984); that there is septic efflux and sewage back-up into the house, id.; that 
the building was not luxury as represented, but in fact dangerously built, Cooper, 56 Cal. 
App. 3d at 865, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 726; that the basement be dry, McGerr v. Beals, 180 Neb. 
767,769, 145 N.W.2d 579,582 (1966); that there be an optional sewer system hook-up, Foust 
v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 164, 164-65, 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1124 (1981); that 
there were mUltiple murders on the property ten years earlier, Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 
3d 261, 267, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1983); that the neighboring wooded lot remain as such, 
Currey v. Kornack, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978) aff'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) 
(LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
Brokers must determine which characteristics of the property are important to the buyer 
in order to determine whether they must disclose them. Materiality thus can be determined 
by whether it would affect the property's market value. Reed, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 267, 193 
Cal. Rptr. at 133. "[S]o long as information is known or accessible ... and will have watered 
effect on marketability, there is no reason" not to disclose it. Id. 
Materiality is also established when the misrepresentation of a factor induces the purchaser 
to buy the property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977). 
93 Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735-37, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05. 
94 See, e.g., Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976) (rule 
is: "broker is liable to buyer for nondisclosure of defects known to him .... "); Elder v. 
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 382, 384 P.2d 802, 803 (1963) (broker liable for nondisclosure of 
quarantine on property due to noxious weed where broker was aware of it); Maples v. Porath, 
638 S.W. 2d 337, 339-40 (Mo. App. 1982); Romero, supra note 10, at 780. Cf. Lingsch, 213 
Cal. App. 2d at 738, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 206, Treece & Mead, supra note 89, at 17. 
95 See, e.g., Roberts, 513 A.2d at 1130-31; Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 738,29 Cal. Rptr. 
at 206 ("The concealment must be intentional and it must relate to material information."). 
96 213 Cal. App. 2d at 737, 738,29 Cal. Rptr. at 206, 207 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Roberts, 
513 A.2d at 1131 (real estate agent had "intentional" policy of nondisclosure of UFFI where 
agent knew of its materiality, and by nondisclosure, prevented buyers from conducting their 
own investigation). 
97 McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 176-77, 646 P.2d 771,774 (1982), aff'd, 101 Wash. 
2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984). 
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material fact that was merely accessible or knowable to the bro-
kers.98 Hence, if brokers are unaware of, but have access to, infor-
mation material to a buyer's decision, they can have an independent 
duty to ascertain the relevant information for the benefit of the 
purchaser. 99 The logical result is that brokers can have a duty to 
ascertain and communicate defects that are material to the buyers' 
decision. Brokers must thus be attentive to the buyers' concerns 
despite the fact that brokers are the sellers' agents. 100 
Some courts have even held brokers liable in nondisclosure when 
they were ignorant of a defect. 101 This has occurred when purchasers 
specifically asked questions about the property and brokers failed to 
determine the facts.102 In such cases, brokers did not need to have 
present knowledge of the defect.103 A buyer's inquiry makes the 
sought-after information material, and the broker must truthfully 
respond because the buyer will rely on the answer.104 The question 
itself effectively gives rise to a duty to do more than hedge: a duty 
to determine the truth on behalf of the purchaser. 105 
98 Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735-37, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05 (broker under duty of 
disclosure where material facts are accessible only to broker) (emphasis added). See, e.g., 
Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 264, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (1983) (under California law, 
broker is liable in fraud for concealing facts susceptible of knowledge); Currey v. Kornack, 
No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), a/I'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, 
Del file) (inadvertent nondisclosure and thus fraud where selling broker was unaware of and 
failed to disclose material factor though seller disclosed to listing broker); Sawyer v. Tildahl, 
275 Minn. 457, 461, 148 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1967) (broker liable for nondisclosure where, though 
broker did not actually know of water seepage, information was "susceptible of knowledge"). 
99 Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735-37, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05; Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 13, 1978), a/I'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). But see 
Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 270 (Ala. 1977) (real estate broker is not under Lingsch 
duty unless broker was agent of buyer as well as of seller); Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 
4 Ohio App. 3d 164, 165, 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (1981) (broker required to reveal material 
facts known to him); Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 383, 884 P.2d 802, 805 (1963) (broker 
liable in nondisclosure based on superior knowledge). 
100 See generally Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); 
Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), a/I'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19,1979) (LEXIS, States 
library, Del file) (selling broker deemed to have same knowledge of property as owner and 
where listing and selling brokers failed to exercise care to assure that selling broker has same 
information as seller and listing broker, selling broker committed nondisclosure and sale is 
rescinded). 
101 Treece & Mead, supra note 89, at 17-18; Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), 
a/I'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
102 Treece & Mead, supra note 89, at 17; Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), a/I'd, 
No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
103 Treece & Mead, supra note 89, at 17; Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), a/I'd, 
No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
104 Treece & Mead, supra note 89, at 17; Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), a/I'd, 
No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
105 Treece & Mead, supra note 89, at 17 (citing Berryman v. Riegart, 286 Minn. 270, 175 
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There are a number of reasons for holding real estate brokers 
liable to purchasers for nondisclosure. (They are similar to the rea-
sons for finding liability in misrepresentation.) Because real estate 
brokers are a party to the transaction and derive personal profit 
from the sale, they are under the same duties of disclosure as their 
agents, the sellers.106 Furthermore, the brokers' knowledge alone 
gives rise to a duty to disclose if the information is material, because 
buyers will rely on the brokers' statements. 107 Of course, if buyers 
inquire about a factor, brokers risk liability in fraud if they do not 
answer truthfully.108 Courts reason that buyers are justified in re-
lying on brokers' representations. 109 
The broker's duty in nondisclosure is thus not simply to speak the 
truth, as in fraud, but to provide information which purchasers deem 
relevant. This duty may arise when brokers know of a material 
defect of which buyers are unaware; or when a material fact is 
accessible (that is, the broker should know of its existence); or when 
the buyer inquires. Brokers acting on behalf of buyers to ascertain 
accessible, relevant, or sought-after information, or risking liability 
for failing to do so, necessitates that they anticipate the needs and 
concerns of buyers. Though not quite imposing an independent duty 
on brokers to investigate for material defects, this duty requires 
vigilance for the benefit of the purchasers, and anticipates the bro-
kers' responsibility to seek out material defects on behalf of buyers. 
This duty is an antecedent to the standard laid out in Easton where 
N.W.2d 438 (1970»; Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), aff'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 
19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). 
106 Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 736~7, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963). 
107 See Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 164, 165, 446 N.E.2d 1121, 1125 
(1981) (seller's "realty agents have a duty to disclose any matelial facts which are not visible 
and nondisclosure is willful misrepresentation"). Cf. Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 738, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. at 206; see, e.g., Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 
(1976); Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 383, 384 P.2d 802, 803 (1963). 
[A] legal duty to disclose may exist where there is no existing fiduciary relationship 
between the parties and where no special confidence is expressly reposed. The duty 
to disclose may arise from the circumstances of the case, including ... the superior 
knowledge of one party, which knowledge is not within the fair and reasonable reach 
of the other party. 
Maples v. Porath, 638 S. W.2d 337, 340 n.2 (Mo. App. 1982) (quoting Jones v. Arnold, 359 Mo. 
161,221 S.W.2d 187, 193 (1949»; Romero, supra note 10, at 780. 
108 See generally Currey, No. 5436 (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 1978), afI'd, No. 305 (Del. Sept. 19, 
1979) (LEXIS, States library, Del file); Treece & Mead, supra note 89, at 17. 
109 Fausett and Co. v. Bullard, 217 Ark. 176, 179, 229 S.W.2d 490, 491 (1950); Keith v. 
Wilder, 241 N.C. 672, 675-76, 86 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1955); but see Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 
2d 268, 270 (Ala. 1977) (court refused to follow Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 
201 (1983), and held caveat emptor remains intact where defect does not affect health). 
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brokers are responsible to purchasers in negligence to disclose in-
formation reasonably ascertainable by independent, diligent inspec-
tion. 
3. The Broker's Negligent Misrepresentation 
The third theory in the broker's trilogy of liability for failure to 
disclose facts, and the final step toward a real estate broker's obli-
gation to buyers in simple negligence, is liability for negligent mis-
representation. 110 While the two previous causes of action delineate 
the broker's duty of truthfulness in disclosure, the negligent misre-
presentation standard defines the duty of a professional to avoid 
providing false information by taking reasonable care in ascertaining 
and disseminating facts. 111 With negligent misrepresentation, the 
focus is on how the information is obtained in addition to how it is 
disclosed. 
The duty to disclose here sounds in negligence:112 that is, brokers 
must take reasonable care in acquiring information and disclosing 
1If1 "One who in the course of his business, profession or guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance 
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
comrnunicating the information." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (emphasis 
added). 
III First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 281-
82, 574 P.2d 1211, 1215-16 (1978) (broker must exercise due care in determining boundary of 
sale property); see Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (La. App. 1982), cert. denied, 427 
So. 2d 870 (La. 1983); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1980). 
Negligent misrepresentation is distinct from a misrepresentation made innocently. In the 
former, a broker is liable for breaching a duty to the buyer to take reasonable care, as a 
professional, to confirm the truth of his or her statements. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 552 (1977). The latter type of statement, known as innocent misrepresentation, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) (1977), provides for broker liability regardless of any 
fraud or breach of duty. See Comment, Realtor Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation and 
Undiscovered Defects: Balancing the Equities Between Broker and Buyer, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 
255 (1986). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) states: 
One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, makes a misrepre-
sentation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act ... is subject 
to liability to the other for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance 
upon the misrepresentation, even though it is not made fraudulently or negligently. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment e (1977). Comment e reads 
[T]he rule of liability . . . is based upon negligence[;] the defendant is subject to 
liability if ... he has failed to exercise the care or competence of a reasonable man 
in obtaining or communicating the information .... [T]he supplier will exercise that 
care and competence in its ascertainmen~ which the supplier's business or profession 
requires .... [S]uch investigations as are necessary will be carefully made and that 
... informant will have normal business or professional competence .... 
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defects. 113 A broker's duty under negligent misrepresentation is to 
take care to "confirm or refute information from the seller which he 
knows, or should know, is pivotal to the transaction from the buyer's 
perspective. "114 Because the purchasers will rely on that information 
in making decisions, this duty then specifically requires brokers-
who stand to benefit from the transaction115-to take reasonable 
steps on behalf of purchasers to investigate the accuracy of the 
brokers' or the sellers' statements. 116 
While real estate brokers must already disclose material infor-
mation that is accessiblell7 or actually in their possession, 118 negligent 
misrepresentation additionally specifically requires a broker to un-
dertake reasonable investigation. 119 Courts may expect brokers to 
inquire as to the accuracy of the property's description before listing 
it in the multiple listing service. 120 Courts may also consider real 
estate brokers to be on notice that there are potential defects that 
[d.; Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 706, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1980) ("liability attaches 
... on grounds of negligence"). See, e.g., First Church of the Open Bible, 19 Wash. App. at 
281-82, 574 P.2d at 1215-16 (given confusion over precise property boundaries, broker's duty 
is to ascertain exact bounds of sale property). According to at least one commentator, the 
theory of liability proffered in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) subjects 
an agent to liability in negligence. Comment, Developments in Utah Law-Property Law: 
Broker Can Be Held Liable for Negligent Misrepresentation to Vendee, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 
229, 231; cf. Josephs, 420 So. 2d at 1185, cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (La. 1983) ("[T]o apply 
negligent misrepresentation, there must be a legal duty to supply the correct information, 
and a breach of that duty causing damage to plaintiff. "). 
113 See Tennant, 26 Wash. App. at 706, 615 P.2d at 1309 (broker's duty is to "take reasonable 
steps to avoid disseminating to the buyer false information"). 
114 Tennant, 26 Wash. App. at 706, 615 P.2d at 1310 (emphasis added); Hoffman v. Connall, 
108 Wash. 2d 69, 77, 736 P.2d 242, 246 (1987). 
115 Real estate brokers' commissions represent their "pecuniary interest" in the sale. Com-
ment, supra note 34, at 328. 
116 See, e.g., Tennant, 26 Wash. App. at 706, 615 P.2d at 1310 (broker liable for failing to 
take due care to verify); Josephs, 420 So. 2d at 1185, cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (La. 1983) 
("Where one real estate broker negotiated for both vendor and vendee, it is particularly 
important that the broker-agent relay accurate information, since both parties are relying on 
his honesty, accesss to information, knowledge and expertise."(emphasis in original)). 
117 See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 73-79, 89, 94 and accompanying text. 
119 Tennant, 26 Wash. App. at 707, 615 P.2d at 1310 (broker held liable for negligence in 
failing "to take the simple steps within her area of expertise and responsibility" to discover 
flaw); see, e.g., Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 263, 265, 389 N.E.2d 
623,627,629 (1979) (Moran, J., dissenting). 
120 Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963) (holding 
broker "jointly and severally liable with the seller for the full amount of the damages as a . 
party connected to the fraud" for relaying seller's false statements); Gouveia v. Citicorp 
Person-to-Person Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 575-76, 686 P.2d 262, 265 (1984); First 
Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 281, 574 P.2d 
1211, 1215 (1978). 
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they must confirm. For example, the real estate broker in First 
Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc. 121 "had a 
hunch that something was amiss" in the listing's description of the 
property's boundaries. The Washington Appeals Court held that 
where brokers suspect that something is wrong, they must verify 
the truth or falsity of the information. 122 
There is also precedent for holding a broker liable for negligently 
misrepresenting a fact about which the broker did not know, but 
should have known. 123 The broker in Johnson v. Geer Real Estate 
CO.124 was found liable for stating that the house was on the city 
sewer when it was not. The sellers were themselves entirely una-
ware of the sewer and held blameless. 125 But, because there were 
indications of a septic tank that the trained broker should have 
detected, the court affirmed that the failure to discover the septic 
tank's presence was a breach of the broker's duty to the buyer to 
disclose material facts that the broker should have known. 126 
Negligent misrepresentation does not impose on brokers any sep-
arate requirement to make a general inspection of all aspects and 
attributes of the property for the benefit of any prospective pur-
chasers.127 Rather, the seller's or broker's representations to the 
buyer trigger the duty. There is nevertheless a duty to investigate: 
to avoid liability for negligent misrepresentation, brokers need to 
ensure that information which is disclosed is correct, and that which 
is undisclosed is not material. 128 
There are many rationales for establishing the real estate brokers' 
duty in negligent misrepresentation. With motives similar to those 
for holding brokers liable in fraudulent misrepresentation and con-
cealment,129 courts have reasoned that, because buyers will rely on 
the information brokers provide, brokers have a duty to assure that 
121 19 Wash. App. at 277-78,281-82, 574 P.2d at 1213, 1215-16. 
'"' Id. 
12:< Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 239 Kan. 324, 332, 720 P.2d 660,665 (1986). 
12' Id. 
125Id. 
12" Id. at 330-31, 720 P.2d at 664-65. The court cited the Kansas Real Estate Brokers and 
Salespersons Licensing Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3062(a)(31) (1983) as specifically stating 
that the broker's duty in this case is to disclose that which the broker knew or should have 
known. 
127 Compare notes 104-05 and accompanying text. 
12K See supra note 62. If the buyer inquires into a matter about whicl:t the broker has no 
knowledge, the broker can avoid buyer's reliance on any broker-representations by simply 
asserting ignorance. Id. Once the broker makes a representation, however, the broker can be 
chargeable if it is negligently made. See supra notes 110-27. 
12" See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
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their information is correct. 130 Purchasers view real estate brokers 
as being experts who have the necessary, reliable knowledge about 
the property.131 As between the buyer and the broker, the latter is 
in a superior position to gain knowledge. 132 Furthermore, from the 
purchasers' point of view, the real estate transaction is a significant 
expense and a confusing procedure, where one must rely on the 
brokers' honesty.133 Finally, the underlying purpose of requiring 
brokers to hold real estate licenses is to protect the public from 
abuses through regulation of brokers. 134 
Before the decision in Easton, therefore, case law had established 
a legal relationship between real estate broker and purchaser despite 
the absence of contractual privity. The courts imposed a real estate 
broker duty of disclosure to buyers distinct from those broker re-
sponsibilities that are derivative of the sellers' duty to buyers. 135 
States have also looked to the licensing requirements to find that 
real estate brokers owe the buying public a quasi-fiduciary duty of 
honesty and fairness to conduct their business in a competent man-
ner.136 By the beginning of the 1980s, there was precedent in the 
tort law of fraudulent misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and negli-
gent misrepresentation, for the real estate brokers' legal duty to 
buyers. This legal duty is to ascertain and disclose truthfully all 
characteristics of the property that would materially affect its value 
or desirability, because: 1) brokers are aware of the defects and of 
the buyers' ignorance; 2) brokers should have been aware of the 
defects; 3) the defects are inquired about; or 4) brokers should have 
taken reasonable care to assure that all material information be 
accurately disclosed. 137 
lao Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (La. App. 1982), cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 870 
(La. 1983). 
131Id. 
132 Cf. Hoffman v. Connall, 108 Wash. 2d 69, 73, 736 P.2d 242, 244 (1987). 
133 Josephs, 420 So. 2d at 1185. 
1:14 Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 232, 647 P.2d 433, 434 (1982). As one 
commentator stated, "[ilf the law did not require a standard of competence and integrity, 'the 
license would serve only as a foil to lure the unsuspecting public into being duped by people 
more skilled ... in such affairs.'" Comment, supra note 112, at 231 (quoting Reese v. Harper, 
8 Utah 2d 119, 122, 329 P.2d 410, 412 (1958». 
135 See, e.g., Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 164, 164-65, 446 N.E.2d 
1122, 1125 (1981) (buyer entitled to rely on realtor's representations because of broker-buyer 
fiduciary relationship); see also Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860,866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 
727 (1976) (in action against sales agents and architects of new condominiums, agents are 
liable for nondisclosure, but architects are not under same duty to disclose); Lingsch v. Savage, 
213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 734, 20 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05 (1963) (real estate broker has duty of 
disclosure that does not depend on contractual privity). 
136 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra notes 73-136 and accompanying text. See also supra note 7. 
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The broker duty in fraud however, has its limits. In none of these 
causes of action were brokers required to conduct an independent 
inspection of the premises for the benefit of the buyer and to disclose 
signs of defects. The broker duty prior to Easton was anchored in 
the facts of each case and depended on the knowledge of the buyer, 
the extent to which state law viewed agents as independent of their 
principals, and the brokers' access to defects and awareness of the 
buyers' knowledge. For instance, the law of fraudulent concealment 
has imposed on a real estate broker a duty merely to reveal material 
defects about which they know, or which is accessible or sought-
after. 138 Absent the broker's current suspicion or knowledge, or the 
buyer's inquiries, in no case under these various theories of broker 
liability has a broker the incentive independently to inspect the 
property. While fraud and negligent misrepresentation require bro-
kers to conduct investigations for buyers, that duty is usually limited 
to conducting an investigation sufficient to ensure that the disclosed 
information is accurate, or, to the extent necessary to prevent dis-
semination of false information. 139 Though brokers must know the 
property well enough to ensure the veracity of their (or of the 
sellers') statements, the duty under this cause of action does not 
otherwise mandate any affirmative, independent investigation of the 
property for signs of defects. 
Toxic contamination, one of the potential defects, often only man-
ifests signals of its presence. Unless brokers know about a potential 
for pollution, or that contamination exists, or unless the buyers 
specifically inquire about it, the property will pass on to unsuspecting 
purchasers while the sellers and brokers benefit from the sale. Under 
the current theories, if the subject of toxic contamination was not 
already raised, brokers have no motivation to conduct even a cursory 
inspection of the property for signs of toxic pollution. The opportu-
nity to discover contamination therefore, will be overlooked if bro-
kers are not required to inspect. 
Further, innocent purchasers of contaminated land may fall within 
the sweep of liability under the comprehensive schemes of both the 
state and federal superfund statutes. 140 Under such statutes, con-
138 See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
139 Latter and Blum, Inc. v. Richmond, 388 So. 2d 368, 372 (La. 1980) ("The precise duties 
of a real estate broker must be determined by an examination of the nature of the task the 
real estate agent undertakes to perform and the agreements he makes with the involved 
parties."). Cf. First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc., 19 Wash. App. 
275, 281-82, 574 P.2d 1211, 1215-16 (1978). 
140 131 CONGo REc. H11,159 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Moakley). Section 
101(f) of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) was passed to 
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taminated property can become subject to a lien for cleanup or 
removal costS.141 For instance, liability for cleanup under the federal 
Superfund statute is joint and several, and can attach to all past and 
present owners of contaminated property, regardless of participation 
in or knowledge of pollution. 142 Thus, new purchasers may be held 
responsible even when they were ignorant of the contamination at 
the time of purchase, and regardless of the status of past owners' 
responsibility. 143 Additionally, where contamination in the surround-
ing area has seeped onto the buyers' property, the sellers-them-
selves unaware of the problem-cannot necessarily absolve the pur-
chaser of potential clean-up liability under Superfund. 144 Even 
Superfund's new innocent landowner defense145 may prove elusive. 
To avail themselves of this defense,146 purchasers must demonstrate 
exempt the wholly innocent landowner from liability. SARA § 101(f), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 
1986 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN. NEWS 000 Stat.) 1613, 1616 (1986) (amending CERCLA, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)0)-(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). While no case law to date 
addresses the effectiveness of the innocent-landowner defense, the burden of demonstrating 
innocence under this defense is becoming increasingly more demanding. See Mays, Settlements 
with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement Procedures Under the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,101, 10,107 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (Apr. 
1987). 
141 SARA § 107(f), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
1630 (1986) (amending CERCLA §§ 9607(\), (m) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also N.J. Spill 
Compensation & Control Act, N.J. REV. STAT. § 58-1O-23.11(f) (980); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 
21E, § 13 (1983). See generally Note, The Impact of State "Superlien" Statutes on Real Estate 
Transactions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 297 (1986). 
142 H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2855-56; 42 U.S.C. § 9607 0982 & Supp. III 1985); Cf. Light, Federal 
Preemption, Federal Conscription Under the New Superfund Act, 38 MERCER L. REV. 643, 
652 (987). 
143 131 CONGo REC. H11,159 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Moakley) ("Unfor-
tunately, under present law and EPA policy, we ... hold an innocent landowner ... respon-
sible."); H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2855-56; 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
144 All owners, past, present and future will be held liable unless there is some previous 
indemnity arrangement. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 253 (1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2855-56; 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
145 SARA § 101(f), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
1616 (986) (amending CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(1)-(3) (1982 & Supp. III 
1985). 
146 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) 0982 & Supp. III 1985) states that the defendant will not be liable 
under CERCLA if the defendant 
can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release 
of a hazardous substance [was 1 caused solely by. . . a third party. . . if the defendant 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with 
respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the charac-
teristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, 
and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third 
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that before buying, they made every effort to determine the pres-
ence of contamination. 147 Real estate brokers could aid buyers in this 
effort by independently investigating on purchasers' behalf for the 
presence of pollution. Only under a standard of care in negligence 
would brokers be required to conduct a reasonable, independent 
investigation of the property on behalf of buyers, for material de-
fects-such as the presence of toxic contamination-regardless of 
whether any party originally was aware of it. 
III. NEGLIGENCE AND THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S DUTY OF 
CARE-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BROKER LIABILITY: EASTON 
V. STRASSBURGER 
Only three states have held that real estate brokers can be liable 
in simple negligence for failing to conduct an independent investi-
gation and to disclose potential defects to purchasers. 148 The three 
states that have adopted this standard have done so by explicitly 
citing the California Court of Appeals decision in Easton v. Strass-
burger. 149 In Easton, the court established that sellers' real estate 
brokers owe an affirmative duty to purchasers "to conduct a reason-
ably competent and diligent inspection of the residential property 
listed for sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts 
materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that 
such an investigation would reveal. "150 
In Easton, the plaintiff-purchasers bought a house, a guest house, 
and swimming pool from the Strassburgers. 151 The house had been 
built on landfill that had been incorrectly engineered and com-
pacted. 152 Prior to the sale, the Strassburgers had experienced two 
party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions 
[d. 
147 [d.; see, e.g., Mays, supra note 140. 
148 Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); Gouveia v. 
Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (1984); Secor v. 
Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986). 
149 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383. See also Gouveia, 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262; 
Secor, 716 P.2d 790. 
150 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (footnote omitted). The court specifically 
held that there was no error in the instructions to the jury that a seller's broker in a residential 
real estate transaction "is under a duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value or 
desirability of the property ... which through reasonable diligence should be known to him." 
[d. at 98, 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 391. 
151 [d. at 96-97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86. 
152 [d. 
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earth slides but never told the real estate agents about this defect. 153 
Nevertheless, the brokers, who had conducted a limited inspection 
of the property several times before the sale,154 observed "red flags" 
that indicated soil instability.155 For instance, the agents knew that 
the house was built on landfill, because they had seen netting on the 
property. 156 The owners used the netting to maintain the slope after 
a recent slide. 157 In addition, the brokers noted that some of the 
guest house floors were warped and not level, and the walls were 
cracked. 158 Yet, the brokers did not bring these red flags to the 
purchasers' attention. 159 The fact that the brokers were cognizant of 
red flags, that is, indications of possible soil problems, means that 
the brokers were effectively put on constructive notice that there 
was a potential material defect that would be of importance to buy-
ers.160 Actual notice of soil instability, however, was unnecessary for 
liability in negligence to attach. 161 The court held that the brokers' 
failure to further question the sellers or request soil testing, and 
failure to indicate these flags to the buyers was the breach of this 
real estate broker duty. 162 
The court based its reasoning on three premises. First, case prec-
edent implied a similar duty.163 Brokers already had a duty to com-
municate material facts of which they were, or should have been, 
aware. 164 Second, the court took judicial notice of the ethical stan-
dards set forth in the National Association of Realtors Code of 
Ethics. 165 Based on this Code, the court imposed a legal obligation 
on real estate brokers to conduct themselves according to those 
standards which realtors had already voluntarily assumed. 166 The 
Code sets out an obligation to disclose that which should be known 




156Id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
157Id. 
158Id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385. 
159Id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. 
160 Id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
161Id. at 103-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92. 
162Id. at 104-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
163 Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
164 Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88 (emphasis added). The real estate broker is already 
obligated "to disclose to a buyer material defects known to the broker but unknown to and 
unobservable by the buyer" or risk liability for fraudulent concealment. Id. 
165Id. at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90. 
166Id. 
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competent and diligent investigation would disclose."167 Third, the 
Easton court recognized that the realities of real estate transactions 
called for a delineation of the duty to inspect and disclose. 168 The 
court observed that, because purchasers rely on brokers to protect 
their interests, limiting the broker's duty to disclosing only defects 
the broker already knows would "provide a disincentive" to making 
a diligent inspection and discovering all defects.169 Thus, the broker 
"would be shielded by his ignorance of that which he holds himself 
out to know."17o Further, the court stressed that such a holding would 
"reward both the unskilled broker for his own incompetence," and 
the "unscrupulous broker ... at the expense of those who justifiably 
rely on his advice."171 On balance, the court concluded that as a real 
estate professional, the broker is more familiar with the property 
and with real estate transactions in general than is the buyer. The 
broker thus is better able to bear the burden of discovery. 172 
The standard of care enunciated in Easton is founded on a special 
relationship between the real estate broker and the buyer. This 
relationship is the result of the buyers' justified reliance on bro-
kers.173 Knowing of such reliance, brokers have a duty to look out 
for buyers' concerns. 174 Novice home buyers naturally expect that the 
brokers are working for them and will protect their interests. 175 
Furthermore, real estate brokers hold themselves out as experts in 
real estate matters and are frequently called upon for advice in 
choosing and valuating a piece of property.176 Citing one commen-
tator, the Easton court analogized this relationship to that of attor-
neys and their clients. 177 Buyers' reliance gives rise to a duty on the 
part of brokers to act competently in ascertaining and disclosing full 
and accurate information. 178 
The duty recognized by the Easton court has two parts. First, 
brokers must disclose to purchasers any indications of material de-
167 [d. 
168 [d. at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. 




173 [d. at 100-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89. 
174 [d. 
175 [d.; see supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. 
176 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
177 [d. (citing Comment, A Reexamination ,1 the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Rela-
tionship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343 (1972)). 
178 152 Cal. App. 3d at 100-01, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. 
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fects.179 This obligation to disclose is not new; it is already widely 
accepted that brokers must disclose to purchasers material facts 
about which brokers know and purchasers are unaware. 180 Thus, the 
only additional requirement of this duty is the second part: the 
obligation to conduct a "reasonably competent and diligent inspection 
... in order to discover defects for the benefit of the buyer. "181 That 
is, brokers must disclose that which they would know by virtue of 
an independent inspection. 
Hence, brokers must investigate the property for defects to fulfill 
this duty to disclose material facts. 182 According to the Easton court, 
brokers must conduct inspections on behalf of purchasers. The in-
spections must be thorough enough to reveal not only manifest de-
fects, but also those facts that are "reasonably discoverable."183 Bro-
kers are thus responsible for discovering and disclosing not only 
material facts about which they know, but also facts about which 
they reasonably should know. l84 To establish liability, buyers must 
show that a "competent and diligent inspection would have uncov-
ered" the flaws. 185 Buyers thus need not show that brokers knew of 
the defects, as required in fraudulent misrepresentation actions. Nor 
must buyers show that they ever raised the issue of defects, as they 
would have to in nondisclosure actions. 186 In fact, this duty in neg-
ligence arises before there is a question of fraud. Under Easton, 
brokers must act independently to discover reasonably ascertainable 
facts for buyers before buyers raise the issue. 187 
Although the Easton court set new precedent by establishing real 
estate broker liability in simple negligence, the Easton decision does 
not imply that brokers are subject to strict liability.l88 Because the 
179 Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
18°Id. (citing Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976) and 
Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1963)). 
181 Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
182Id. at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. 
183Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
184Id. 
185Id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (emphasis omitted). The court recognized that at times, 
depending on the facts, expert testimony may be necessary to determine whether the broker 
breached the standard of care of the reasonable, prudent real estate broker. Id. at 105, 199 
Cal. Rptr. at 393. 
186Id. at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. 
187Id. at 99, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388, 390. 
188 But see Fossey & Roston, The Broker's Liability in a Real Estate Transaction: Bad 
News and Good News for Defense Attorneys, 12 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 37 (1982-83) (arguing 
that the 1982 Alaska Supreme Court decision in Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982), 
"adopted a rule of strict liability for any misrepresentations that a broker makes or commu-
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standard sounds in mere negligence, brokers are only liable for 
damages that their breach of duty proximately caused. 189 Thus, a 
broker would not automatically be liable to buyers every time the 
property sold proves to be polluted. 190 Rather, the courts recognize 
that, at times, depending on the facts, expert testimony may be 
necessary to determine whether the broker breached the standard 
of care of the reasonable, prudent real estate broker. 191 Brokers can 
also seek indemnity from the sellers. 192 Furthermore, brokers may 
mitigate their liability by demonstrating that the buyer is compar-
atively or contributorily negligent. Under Easton, the brokers' lia-
bility may be reduced if they can demonstrate that the buyers failed 
to take steps to protect themselves. 193 For example, if the defect is 
obvious to all parties, then the buyer may be charged with having 
had notice, thus negating the broker's duty to disclose. 194 In Easton, 
the court allowed the broker to receive partial indemnity from the 
seller, and found the buyer five percent negligent as well. 195 
Two other states have followed the Easton duty of care: New 
Mexico and Utah. 196 The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Gouveia 
v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center,197 cited the Restate-
ment of Torts,198 case precedent,199 and Easton in holding that real 
estate brokers can have a duty to disclose "defects that an inspection 
would reveal. "200 In Gouveia, the broker had listed a townhouse for 
sale as being in top condition, without having actually inspected it. 201 
nicates in a real estate transaction"). Such a rule would be stricter than holding the broker 
liable in simple negligence. 
189 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 111-12, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97. 
190 Cf. id; supra note 188; supra note Ill. 
191 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93. 
192Id. at 107, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 393. 
193 Id. at 106-10, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95. 
194 Id.; see, e.g., Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 164, 165,446 N.E.2d 
1122, 1125 (1981) (seller's and agent's duty is to disclose any facts that are not visible to 
buyer). If defects are visible to the buyer, the broker may not have a duty to disclose. The 
accepted doctrine is that the real estate broker may be liable for failing to disclose latent 
defects about which the broker knew, while believing that the buyer was ignorant of them. 
Treece & Mead, supra note 89 at 21; see, e.g., Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial 
Center, 101 N.M. 572, 577, 686 P.2d 262,267 (1984) (defects unavailable to buyer but available 
to broker are subject to disclosure). 
195 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 111-13, 199 Cal. Rptr. 396-97. 
196 See Gouveia, 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262; Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986). 
197 Gouveia, 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262. 
198Id. at 576, 686 P.2d at 266. 
199Id. (citing Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984)). 
200Id. at 576-77, 686 P.2d at 266. 
201 Id. at 575, 686 P.2d at 265. 
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After they bought it, the purchasers found substantial defects in the 
townhouse construction.202 The court stated that the brokers' actions 
would be measured by whether the broker conformed to the com-
munity standard of care to know or to discover the building's de-
fects. 203 Although the Gouveia court based the brokers' liability on 
negligent misrepresentation, the court explicitly cited the Easton 
duty to inspect the property on behalf of potential purchasers. 204 
Thus, a court in New Mexico can hold a broker liable in negligence 
for failing to discover defects if the broker could have gained actual 
knowledge while conforming to community standards of practice. 205 
The Gouveia court's reasoning is similar to that of the Easton 
court. In Easton, the duty was based on a special relationship be-
tween brokers and buyers arising from the buyers' justified reli-
ance. 206 The Gouveia court found that brokers have a fiduciary duty 
to anyone who relies on their representations. 207 Because reasonable 
listing-brokers will realize that potential purchasers (as well as other 
brokers) would rely on their description of the property, they must 
exercise care and competence in obtaining information for the list-
ing.208 Indeed, according to the Gouveia court, brokers must disclose 
material defects of which they do not have actual knowledge if failing 
to discover and disclose them would breach the community standard 
of the reasonable real estate broker.209 The standard of care accord-
ing to Gouveia, then, depends on the facts and circumstances and 
may include a duty to disclose those defects that an inspection would 
reveal. 210 
In Secor v. Knight, the Utah Court of Appeals noted its approval 
of the Easton decision. 211 In Secor, the court asserted in dicta that 
202Id. 
203Id. at 577-78, 686 P.2d at 267-68. 
204Id. at 576, 686 P.2d at 266. 
205Id. at 576-77, 686 P.2d at 266-68 (citing Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 
647 P.2d 433 (1982)). 
206 See supra text accompanying note 173. 
207 Gouveia, 101 N.M. at 576, 686 P.2d at 266. 
208Id. at 575-77,686 P.2d at 265-67. 
209Id. at 577, 686 P.2d at 267. 
210 Id. at 576,686 P.2d at 267 (citing Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 647 P.2d 
433 (1982)). 
211 716 P.2d 790, 795 n.1 (Utah 1986). The Utah Supreme Court in Secor held that the 
purchasers could not avoid enforcement of a restrictive covenant because they were on notice 
of the covenant's existence. Id. at 794. The deficiency of pleading coupled with the merger 
doctrine required a finding against the buyers. Id. The case thus is not about a real estate 
agent's duty to inspect; the facts here are about the defects of which the broker was aware. 
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real estate brokers have a duty to investigate for and disclose ma-
terial defects to buyers independent of the sellers' responsibility.212 
The Secor court, concerned with what it viewed as the real estate 
brokers' and seller's unethical conduct, stated that the buyers ought 
to be protected from such dishonest behavior.218 In that case, the 
broker was aware of a restrictive covenant prohibiting duplexes on 
the property. The broker merely alluded to the covenant, but did 
not explicitly tell the buyer about it.214 The court expressed its 
approval of the Easton disclosure requirement as an alternative to 
the "substandard conduct"215 of this broker. 
Together these cases reveal that the real estate broker's duty to 
potential purchasers is to conduct a reasonable, diligent inspection 
of property for the benefit of buyers, regardless of red flags,216 and 
to disclose any material facts which such inspection would uncover. 217 
What is "reasonable" depends on community or licensing standards. 
The duty does not rest solely on the fact of a statement, or on 
concealed knowledge. Breach of this duty occurs if the broker fails 
to discover those flags that a reasonable investigation would uncover, 
before the subject is raised by the buyer's inquiries or by the seller's 
or broker's statements or concealments. This new standard in neg-
ligence is essentially the "knew or should have known" standard 
used in nondisclosure, negligent misrepresentation, and in other 
areas of tort law. 218 However, only in these cases is this standard 
specifically articulated as a real estate broker duty in simple negli-
gence to investigate independently for the buyer's benefit as well as 
to disclose accurately all material information. 
Yet, in dicta, the Court disapproved of the conduct of the seller and the real estate broker in 
the sale and specifically indicated its approval of the real estate broker's duty as defined in 
Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984). Id. at 795 n.l. The 
decision can be read as a signal to brokers that the Utah Supreme Court will take that route 
should a case with the right facts arise. 
212Id. 
2t:l Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 n.1 (Utah 1986). 
214 I d. at 794. 
215 I d. at 795. 
216 See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 
(1984). 
217Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. A real estate broker is "under a duty to disclose facts 
materially affecting the value or desirability of the property [that is known to him or] which 
through reasonable diligence should be known to him." (emphasis added). See also Secor, 716 
P.2d at 795 n.1; Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 576, 
686 P.2d 262, 266 (1984) ("if the broker ... should have had, or could have gained, actual 
knowledge ... ") (citing Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 230, 647 P.2d 433 (1982)). 
218 See supra notes 80-85, 98-100, 121-26 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S DUTY IN NEGLIGENCE TO 
BUYERS IN SELLING RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY THAT HAS BEEN 
PREVIOUSLY CONTAMINATED 
This Comment proposes two reasons why other states should 
adopt the Easton standard of care, and why states should apply this 
standard to the sale of previously contaminated property.219 First, 
there is strong precedent for such a duty, so that inspection for 
environmental contamination would impose no significant additional 
function or expertise on real estate brokers. Second, adopting Eas-
ton would further a national goal of ridding the environment of toxic 
pollution. 
A. There is Strong Precedent for the Broker's Duty to Inspect 
The real estate brokers' standard of behavior in negligence is 
essentially to disclose that which they know or reasonably should 
know through investigation. 220 The Easton court's requirement that 
brokers disclose to purchasers information of which they are aware 
is not extraordinary.221 This is the law of fraud and nondisclosure. 222 
The second part of the Easton duty is to disclose information of 
which brokers are not currently aware but which is reasonably ac-
cessible through investigation. 223 This part of the duty is consistent 
with the evolution of real estate broker law and is not a radical 
departure from precedent.224 
According to the Easton court, the brokers' duty to disclose in-
formation about which they should know is "implicit" in the existing 
duty to reveal information that is accessible to them. 225 To satisfy 
this duty, brokers must conduct such an investigation as would 
reasonably uncover such accessible defects. 226 In fact, brokers have 
219 This Comment is concerned only with property that was contaminated before it was put 
up for sale, because the Easton duty is predicated on the presence of signs of defects. Without 
current pollution, there would be no signs of defects on the sale property. 
220 See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text. 
221 See supra notes 62-109 and accompanying text. 
222Id. 
223 Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984). 
224Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (duty to disclose material facts about which the broker 
should have known "is implicit in the rule articulated in Cooper and Lingsch, which speaks 
... to facts that are accessible only to the broker and seller" (emphasis in original)). See 
Gouveia v. Cit;corp Person-to-Person Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 577-78, 686 P.2d 262, 
267 (1984) (broker's defense is that he did not breach standard of care to know of or discover 
defects). See supra notes 62-136 and accompanying text. 
225 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
226 Id. 
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already been held liable in nondisclosure for failing to reveal material 
defects about which they know or which they should know. 227 In 
order to establish whether a factor is material to the buyer's decision, 
the broker must already investigate on the buyer's behalf. 228 
In addition to nondisclosure, negligent misrepresentation is a the-
oretical precursor of this Easton requirement. Under the negligent 
misrepresentation theory, brokers must investigate to assure the 
veracity of their statements, even without prior specific knowledge 
that the statement is inaccurate. 229 To verify representations, neg-
ligent misrepresentation requires brokers to investigate for factors 
about which neither the brokers nor the buyers are necessarily 
aware but which are accessible to the brokers through reasonable 
investigation. 230 For brokers to reveal what they should know, then, 
simply requires an investigation for accessible information. Hence, 
the Gouveia decision, though based on negligent misrepresentation, 
actually holds brokers to a standard of care in negligence to inspect 
for those defects that a reasonable investigation, as defined by com-
munity standards, would reveal. 231 Therefore, precedent already es-
tablished the real estate brokers' duty to reveal all material infor-
mation about which they know or should know. 232 This is not a new 
function for the expert real estate broker. 
Just as this duty to conduct a reasonable inspection and disclose 
all material facts is not a significant change in real estate broker 
law, the Easton requirement imposes no additional burden on bro-
kers to investigate for signs of contamination. Brokers must already 
disclose patent and material defects. 233 Many of the signs of contam-
ination are tangible,234 and material to a decision to buy.235 At most, 
under Easton and its progeny, a real estate broker would be asked 
to be vigilant for signs of environmental contamination. 
In sum, under the theories of negligent misrepresentation, fraud, 
or nondisclosure, the brokers currently have a duty to be informed 
about their "merchandise. "236 Real estate brokers already must in-
227 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra notes 62-139 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra notes 62-136 and accompanying text. 
234 See Fitzgerald interview, supra note 6. 
235 Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, 531 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1987) (presence in the 
house of urea formaldehyde foam insulation was a material fact); see, e.g., infra note 260. 
236 Berryman v. Reigert, 286 Minn. 270, 276, 175 N.W.2d 438,444 (1970); see, e.g., Amato 
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spect the property and inform themselves of flaws that affect the 
property's value or desirability. The only additional aspect to the 
duty, as articulated by the Easton court, is the broker's duty to 
inspect the property for the presence of red flags, independent of 
any representations. That is, under Easton, brokers must determine 
if there are signs of contamination, what those signs are, and 
whether they are material, prior to disclosing them, regardless of 
any sellers' statements or buyers' inquiries. The level of knowledge 
required of a broker to avoid liability in negligence, therefore, is 
essentially no more than that required in tort law of fraud, nondis-
closure, and negligent misrepresentation, or that required to become 
licensed in the first place. 237 
1. What Constitutes an Environmental "Red Flag" 
The Easton decision is factually predicated on the presence of red 
flags which indicated the possibility of soil instability. Yet, the court 
held that actual knowledge of the soil problems was "unnecessary to 
establish liability for negligence."238 Although the extent of an Eas-
ton investigation to discover problems is not clear,239 the Easton 
court states that it must be "something more than casual visual 
v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 233, 647 P.2d 433, 435 (1982); Sawyer v. Tildahl, 275 
Minn. 457, 461, 148 N. W.2d 131, 133 (1967). But see Long v. Brownstone Real Estate Co., 
335 Pa. Super. 268, 274, 484 A.2d 126, 130 (1984) (Wickersham, J., dissenting) (real estate 
broker not expected to be expert on physical quality of property). 
237 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10,153 (b) (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-29-
1 (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2124 (1986). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1O,153(b) 
(West 1986) states that the applicant for a broker's license must take a written exam to 
demonstrate an understanding of the principles of real estate conveyancing, the purposes and 
legal effect of deeds, mortgages, land contracts of sale, economics and appraisals. CAL. Bus. 
& PROF. CODE § 10,153.3 (West 1986) additionally requires a knowledge of the legal aspects 
of real estate. See Reply Brief for Respondents, Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 
199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) (No. A010566). The Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen Act of New 
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-29-1 (1978) subsection 1O(B) , explicitly includes in its written 
exam for the real estate broker's license, "business ethics, writing ... arithmetic, elementary 
principles of land economics and appraisals, a general knowledge of [New Mexico] statutes 
... relating to deeds, mortgages, contracts of sale, agency and brokerage and [all] provisions 
of [this act]." The written examination in Arizona, according to the ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 32-2124 (1986), requires brokers to demonstrate an understanding of, among other things, 
principles of real estate conveyances; the general purpose and legal effect of agency contracts, 
deposit receipts, deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, security agreements, bills of sale, and land 
contracts of sale and leases; principles of business and land economics and appraisals; and a 
general understanding of the obligations between principal and agent, and principles of real 
estate and business practices (emphasis added). 
238 Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391-92 (1984). 
239 Cleland & Koller, Easton v. Strassburger: A Red Flag for California Real Estate Bro-
kers, BEV. HILLS B.J. 16, 19 (Winter, 1985). 
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inspection and general inquiry of the owners. "240 The brokers would 
be required to make a visual inspection that would uncover facts 
which are reasonably apparent.241 Then, any presence of red flags, 
that are the manifestation of possible defects, results in the concom-
itant duty to inquire further and to disclose. 242 The brokers in Eas-
ton, if they had bothered to inquire further about the netting and 
sloped floors, could easily have discovered the earth slides. 243 The 
court held that since they did not disclose these red flags, they 
breached a duty of care.244 Based on its facts, the Easton case does 
not create a requirement to inspect for any possible latent defect 
such as invisible signs of pollution. 245 The inspection would encom-
pass defects which are not obvious but do manifest warning signals. 
What is a "warning signal" depends on the facts of the case. 246 There 
may be flags or signs of pollution. Therefore, under the reasoning in 
Easton, after a diligent inspection, the duty to disclose would be 
triggered by the discovery of a red flag or a reasonably obvious sign 
of the possible existence of contamination. 
In Easton, the red flags were visible, tangible indications of soil 
erosion such as netting on the hill slope and slanted floors. Numerous 
indications of possible environmental contamination can also be tan-
gible. Many toxins give off vapors or odors which, depending on 
their strength, would raise the suspicions of even a nonastute ob-
server.247 Visible signs of possible chemical contamination are veg-
etative distress, discoloration or staining of vegetation or of base-
ment walls and floors, and even liquid seeping, or matter oozing into 
houses through the ground-level walls. 248 The more celebrated signs 
240 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392. 
"" [d. at 103-04, 199 Cal. Rptr at 39l. 
242 [d. 
243 [d. 
244 [d. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 39l. 
245 See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383. Real estate brokers have never 
been obligated to disclose latent defects, i.e., defects about which the broker could not gain 
information, except those that have been inquired after by purchasers. Cf. Amato v. Rathbun 
Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 647 P.2d 433 (1982). See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying 
text. 
246 Reply Brief for Respondents at 10, Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 
Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) (No. AOl0566). For example, in Easton, the netting, sloped floor, and 
cracked walls were warning signs of earth slides. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 
391. In McGerr v. Beals, 180 Neb. 767, 769, 145 N. W.2d 579, 582 (1966), the broker explained 
away the sump pump in the yard as being purely precautionary when the broker was aware 
of problems with flooding in the basement. 
247 See Fitzgerald interview, supra note 6. 
248 [d. 
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of toxic waste are dry wells, rusty drums, and other types of disposal 
containers.249 Finally, certain contaminants of the water supply can 
be tasted, smelled, or seen.250 If real estate brokers detected these 
warning signs, they would be liable to the buyer in fraud for attempts 
to conceal them by active measures or by nondisclosure. 
Under the decisions in Easton, Gouveia, and Secor, however, if 
brokers failed to discover these visible signs through "something 
more than a casual, visual inspection," and disclose at least their 
presence to the purchasers, the brokers would be liable in negli-
gence. 251 This sort of toxic warning sign is not unlike those of the 
Easton case. While their meaning may be unfamiliar to the novice 
homebuyer-whether it be vegetative distress and strange odors, 
or netting and sloped floors-their meaning requires a minimum of 
explanation. As in Easton, where the broker knew the red flags' 
meaning, the brokers should point out their significance to the in-
nocent buyer. Where some of the signals indicating possible contam-
ination are analogous to the facts of Easton-that is, detectable by 
an attentive inspection-the broker's obligation is to disclose such 
warning signs. 
Other red flags are more subtle. The most common avenue for 
contamination of both the drinking water and land is through private 
wells and septic systems. 252 This is because many household toxic 
wastes, such as paint thinner and motor oil, are poured down drains 
and come to rest in unclean septic tanks.253 When the tanks become 
full, they can overflow and leech into the ground water.254 In addi-
tion, drinking wells receive water through underground streams that 
could be carrying toxins. 255 For a concerned homebuyer it may thus 
be important to know what kind of water and sewer system is under 
the house. This would then be a material fact for disclosure. 256 Be-
cause water and sewer systems are common avenues for pollution 
entering residential property, they signify a potential for contami-
nation. The presence of a septic tank and the source of water supply 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392. See supra notes 182-86 and 
accompanying text. 




256 Although the presence of a septic system or a private well is not per se a red flag of 
potential pollution, it is worthy of mention to the buyers that they should have it tested for 
cleanliness. 
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are already items that a real estate broker or seller would want to 
reveal, quite apart from their potential as a source of environmental 
contamination. 257 It is no longer merely a matter of a real estate 
broker's duty to speak truthfully. Rather, to satisfy the Easton 
court's duty to investigate, brokers would simply have to determine 
whether the property is on a septic system or a private well (for 
they could also contain warning signs of pollution), and if so, to 
inquire of the owners about possible contamination, and to suggest 
testing to the buyers. 
A third category of more ubiquitous red flags is the character of 
the neighborhood. 258 If there is a gas station nearby that could be 
leaking gasoline from its underground tank, an industrial or manu-
facturing plant that could have generated hazardous waste, a waste 
disposal site, landfill site, or even a farm or nursery where pesticides 
and herbicides are used, then there is a possibility of contamination 
on the property for sale. 259 The source of the potential pollution is 
the red flag. 260 Under Easton, brokers would be required to be 
familiar with the neighborhood, to ask about contamination, and to 
bring this possibility to the attention of the purchasers. 261 
Of course, there may be no duty to disclose if the warning sign is 
so obvious that the buyer is assumed to have notice of it. 262 Where 
the source of possible pollution is the factory next door, for instance, 
the factfinder may determine that the purchaser had notice. 263 Be-
cause toxic contamination is clearly material, only when the brokers 
know that the buyers are unaware of the neighborhood signs would 
brokers have the duty to disclose these obvious sources to purchas-
257 CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, FIVE STEPS TO HELP AVOID Easton LIABILITY 
5 (1984) (Broker's Listing Information Guide & Standard Form) [hereinafter BROKER'S LIST-
ING FORMJ. The sample "Listing Information Disclosure Statement" has a check list of items 
for the broker to inspect and disclose to the buyer. This inventory includes the water supply, 
heat source, type of sewer system, and presence of sump pump and septic tank. [d. 
25H See Fitzgerald interview, supra note 6. 
259 Id. 
260 See, e.g., Affidavit of William and Blanche Jackson at 3-5, ATCO National Bank v. 
Jackson (No. C-3489-83) (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed Aug. 29, 1983). The purchasers stated 
that since they had explicitly mentioned to the broker that they did not want to live near 
toxic dumps, the broker had notice. The broker's consequential failure to mention that the 
"pretty hill" across the street was a toxic landfill, they asserted, was negligence. I d. at 5. 
25! Where toxins from off the sale property can seep in via many avenues, such as ground 
water, or sewer pipes, the character of the neighborhood becomes material. See, e.g., Affidavit 
of William and Blanche Jackson at 2-3, ATCO National Bank (No. C-3489-83). Cf. supra note 
92 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text. 
26:l Cf. Affidavit of William and Blanche Jackson, ATCO National Bank (No. C-3489-83). 
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ers. To avoid liability in negligence, brokers would thus simply have 
to be aware of the neighborhood and mention material facts to buy-
ers.264 
Only when the warning signs are invisible, or after a reasonable 
investigation, the broker discovers no past history of pollution, 
would the broker have no duty to speak under the Easton court's 
standard. If, upon a reasonable, diligent inspection, no signals are 
apparent, then the duty to inspect is satisfied. For instance, in the 
case where invisible or intangible pollution has migrated from afar, 
the signs would be invisible, and there would be nothing in the 
neighborhood to trigger the broker's thoughts about the possibility 
of contamination. It would thus take more than an Easton type of 
reasonable investigation to uncover them. Such an inspection would 
require an engineering or scientific study. It would fall outside the 
facts of Easton where the warning signs were detectable, and the 
broker could discover them by a reasonably diligent inspection. 265 
Therefore, where flags themselves are invisible (that is undetectable 
by diligent inspection) or, even after inspection, there simply are no 
signs of contamination, the broker would not likely be found respon-
sible for failing to discover and reveal them under the Easton stan-
dard of care. 
2. The Duty to Investigate for and Reveal Toxic Contamination 
Imposes No Additional Functional Burden on Real Estate 
Brokers 
This Easton duty in negligence is not a significant departure from 
the job brokers already must perform. Detractors of the Easton 
decision suggest that real estate brokers do not have the required 
expertise to conduct the kinds of investigations that the court had 
in mind. 266 They argue that real estate agents are experts in mar-
keting, bringing together buyers and sellers, and real estate con-
veyancing, not soil science, structural engineering, and chemistry.267 
Yet, to obtain a license, a broker must already be familiar with 
264 There is already precedent for requiring brokers to know the neighborhood. Cf. Amato 
v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 233, 647 P.2d 433,435 (1982) (broker must be familiar 
with the local zoning ordinances and state laws). 
26.5 See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 
(1984); Reply Brief for Respondents at 9-12, Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 
199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) (No. A010566). 
266 Amicus Brief of California Association of Realtors at 7-9, Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 
199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (No. A010566). 
267 [d. 
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financing, mortages, titles, and encumbrances268 which are more 
complex than detecting common signs of contamination. The kinds 
of red flags enumerated here are routine. Many, such as the infamous 
container drums, certainly require no additional expertise or sophis-
tication on the part of the real estate broker outside of an under-
standing of what is normal and what may be out of the ordinary. 
Furthermore, some of these signs such as septic tanks, wells, and 
neighborhood characteristics are items the brokers are already in-
terested in for reasons other than environmental contamination. 269 
Many of these signs are already analogous to, or the same as, items 
to which the real estate broker must already be alert. 270 
Additionally, just as the real estate brokers in Easton had the 
sophistication to know that netting and slanted floors implied pos-
sible soil problems,271 so could an experienced broker understand 
indications of contamination such as strange odors, vegetative dis-
tress, or a neighboring gas station. Signs of pollution-such as water 
discoloration and ooze on the basement walls-do not require any 
technical knowledge. 272 Disclosing such red flags of contamination 
would thus require no significant additional expertise or education 
beyond the level required for a broker's license, nor beyond what 
brokers already know. 273 At most, the signs of contamination, mean-
ingful to a nonscientist, can very easily be incorporated into the 
broker's education and practice. 
Real estate brokers would not have to become scientists or engi-
neers to fulfill their duty.274 Rather, the broker's duty is merely to 
268 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10,153 (West 1986); see supra note 237. But see Amicus 
Brief for California Association of Realtors at 7-8, Easton (No. A010566) (arguing that 
broker's license requires only knowledge of English, arithmetic, conveyancing and real estate 
documentation, business and land economics, appraisals). 
269 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Tildahl, 275 Minn. 457, 459, 148 N.W.2d 131, 132 (1967) (broker is 
familiar with drainage patterns of flood plain in area); Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 
N.M. 231, 233, 647 P.2d 433, 435 (1982) (holding that broker is required to know zoning 
ordinances in area). See supra note 257; see infra note 221. 
270 D. Fink, Legislative Response to Easton, 4 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 18 (Winter 1986); 
BROKER'S LISTING FORM, supra note 257. On the Listing Information Disclosure Statement 
Standard Form the broker is already advised to inspect for septic tanks, heating systems, 
water supply, sump pump, wells, sewer system, water softener, gas hook-up, and defects or 
malfunctions in these and other attributes of the property. Id. 
271 See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 104-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 (1984). 
272 See Fitzgerald interview, supra note 6. For arguments that the Easton duty of disclosure 
does not require any additional broker expertise, see Reply Brief for Respondents at 14, 19, 
Easton (No. A010566); BROKER'S LISTING FORM, supra note 257 at 3-4. 
273 Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, 531 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1987); Reply Brief for 
Respondents at 14, 19, Easton (No. A010566); BROKER'S LISTING FORM, supra note 257, at 
3-4. 
274 Contra Reply Brief for Respondents at 9-12, Easton (No. A010566). 
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conduct the reasonable, visual examination of a competent real estate 
broker according to community standards, that would uncover tan-
gible red flags, and then disclose those flags to buyers. 275 Brokers 
would not have to detect pollution itself; they would simply have to 
ascertain the presence of its warning signs. 
N or must the broker conduct tests to discover actual presence of 
contamination once red flags are found. Under Easton, the residen-
tial real estate broker must inspect all accessible areas of the prop-
erty.276 Any flags that a reasonably competent broker could detect 
would have to be disclosed. If other jurisdictions imposed a duty to 
inspect on a real estate broker, the most that a broker would have 
to do differently would be to learn what these routine, obvious flags 
of pollution are before conducting a reasonable inspection of the 
neighborhood and of the sale-property to determine whether any of 
those flags exist. Brokers must then simply mention to buyers any 
discoveries that such an investigation reveals to avoid liability in 
negligence. 277 The obligation only goes so far as to require a deter-
mination and disclosure of the presence of warning signs. It does 
not require the broker to conduct tests or ascertain the specific kind 
of pollution. 
The Easton duty of investigation does not mean that the respon-
sibility of discovering contamination is solely that of the real estate 
broker.278 Brokers will not become warrantors of the property. On 
the contrary, the brokers' responsibility is merely to conduct a dili-
gent physical inspection to uncover and disclose warning signs that 
are meaningful to a competent, reasonable real estate broker. 279 
Brokers then simply disclose to buyers the presence of pollution's 
red flags. 28o Any sophisticated environmental analysis would be left 
275 See supra note 150, 183, 216-17, 240-42 and accompanying text; see also Gouveia v. 
Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 575, 577, 686 P.2d 262, 266, 267 
(1984). 
276 Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984). 
277 BROKER'S LISTING FORM, supra note 257, at 3-4. 
278 See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 104-11, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391, 392-97. The buyer 
also has a duty to protect himself. If the defect is so obvious that a jury would find that the 
buyer could well have detected it himself, then the broker could be contributorily or compar-
atively negligent. I d. The seller also has a duty to disclose material defects. The court in 
Easton upheld the jury's verdict finding all brokers responsible, and apportioned damages 
among all defendants. Id. at 112, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 397. The court also reversed a part of the 
verdict and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment for partial indemnity in 
favor of one of the realty companies against the sellers. Id. Thus, many parties to the 
transaction can be held liable for failure to disclose. 
279 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390; see also Gouveia v. Citicorp 
Person-to-Person Financial Center, 101 N.M. 572, 576, 686 P.2d 262, 266 (1984). 
280 BROKER'S LISTING FORM, supra note 257, at 3-4. Step 4 is to recommend "that [buyers] 
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to those professionals with the specific skill and education to under-
take it. Furthermore, sellers themselves have an obligation to buy-
ers not to commit fraud or make misrepresentations. 281 To that end, 
they must disclose contamination of which they are aware. What is 
more important, however, is that since this standard is in simple 
negligence, buyers must still take steps to protect themselves or 
they may also be liable. 282 Purchasers will be required to detect 
problems that are so obvious that it would not even require the 
expertise of a broker to translate their meaning. 
The Easton court merely made a legal duty out of what was 
already an obligation voluntarily assumed by the profession in the 
National Association of Realtors Code of Ethics. 283 The Easton de-
cision cited Article 9 of the Code: "[t]he Realtor . ... has an affir-
mative obligation to discover adverse factors that a reasonably com-
petent and diligent investigation would disclose. "284 Further, Articles 
1 and 2 of the Code require the realtor to be informed about matters, 
laws, and regulations affecting the real estate "in his community. "285 
Realtors thus already imposed on themselves an obligation to be 
familiar with neighborhoods. 286 More important for the purposes of 
this Comment, the preamble to the Code mentions as a goal "the 
preservation of a healthful environment,"287 and reflects an overall 
sentiment that realtors presently feel toward the part they play in 
protecting the environment. Thus, the decision in Easton doe~ not 
create an entirely new legal duty or burden for the real estate 
obtain services of 'specialists' to assist in determining what problems may underlie the red 
flag indicators." Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
281 Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 164, 165,446 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (1981) 
(sellers ... have a duty to disclose); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
282 Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
283 Not all real estate brokers are "Realtors." "Realtor" is the name for a member of the 
National Association of Realtors, and of any of the regional branches of the organization, and 
local board of Realtors. Thus, though voluntarily assumed, the Code of Ethics, is nevertheless 
a guide for the conduct of all Realtors. Comment, Realtor Liability for Innocent Misrepre-
sentation and Undiscovered Defects: Balancing the Equities Between Broker and Buyer, 20 
VAL. V.L. REV. 255, 255 n.1 (1986). 
284 National Association of Realtors CODE OF ETHICS, art. 9, (1982) (revised and approved 
by the Delegate Body by the Association at its 75th Annual Convention Nov. 15, 1982). art. 
9. 
285 I d. Art. 2 reads as follows: "In justice to those who place their interests in his care, the 
Realtor should endeavor always to be informed regarding laws, proposed legislation, govern-
mental regulations, public policies, and CUITent market conditions in order to be in a position 
to advise his clients properly." 
286 Id. 
287Id. at preamble. "The Realtor should recognize that the interests of the nation and its 
citizens require the highest and best use of the land and the widest distribution of land 
ownership. They require the ... preservation of a healthful environment." Id. 
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broker. Rather, the court merely articulated a duty already implied 
in precedent, and imposed in law what realtors have already vol-
untarily assumed. 
B. A Real Estate Broker's Duty of Care in Negligence Furthers a 
National Objective to Identify, Localize and Clean Up 
Environmental Contamination 
In recent years there has been an explosion of federal and state 
legislation designed to remedy toxic contamination of the environ-
ment. 288 A number of state laws or proposals require inspection of 
commercial real estate before legal title can pass. 289 The objectives 
behind such laws and proposals are to identify contamination, estab-
lish its extent, localize it, and remedy it. Already these laws have 
had an impact on professional practitioners from state environmental 
offices290 to the real estate bar.291 Holding a real estate broker re-
sponsible in negligence for not inspecting for and disclosing potential 
toxic contamination will further the goals embodied in these laws. 
Failure to apply the Easton court's standard of care, on the other 
hand, can only frustrate these important national objectives at the 
expense not only of the environment but also of the naive homebuyer. 
If states were to adopt the Easton standard of care, real estate 
brokers would have a responsibility to conduct a reasonably diligent 
inspection of property on behalf of buyers, independent of any duty 
of the seller, to locate signs of toxic contamination, and to disclose 
any such signs that may be uncovered. Where the seller is unaware 
of contamination, the broker would be serving both the buyer and 
the pUblic. The buyer would benefit by receiving all of the informa-
tion necessary to make an educated decision. The public would ben-
efit from the discovery of potential environmental contamination so 
2"" See supra note 30. 
""9 See. e.g., N.J. Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 58:1O-23.11(f) 
(West 1982) (imposing a priority lien for clean up and removal of discharges); Blauveldt, New 
Cleanup Laws in New Jersey Impose Increasing Liability on Real Estate, 194 N. Y.L.J. 27, 
(1985) (The N.J. Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-32.11-
58:1O-23.11z (West 1982), imposes liability for clean up of pollution in the transfer, sale and 
lease of commercial property); Houlehan & Parish, Hazardous Waste Regulation: Issues for 
the Real Estate Practitioner, 8 COLO. LAW. 48, 52 (Jan. 1984) (discussing the proposed 
Colorado legislation requiring notation on deeds that the property contains disposed hazardous 
waste). 
290 See Fitzgerald interview, supra note 6. The Department receives many phone calls from 
prospective purchasers of residential real estate seeking to know whether the property for 
sale is "safe." 
291 See supra note 289. 
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that it can begin to remedy the problem. Where the sellers are 
aware of the problem, the brokers, in performing their duty, would 
be aiding the sellers in furthering their legal obligation to the buy-
ers.292 Critics of the Easton decision may argue that it is an unfair 
burden on brokers to investigate for defects on the property for the 
buyers' benefit when brokers are agents of the sellers, because it 
creates a conflict of interest. 293 Once defects are revealed, they may 
argue, the value of the property and the sale price go down. 294 On 
the contrary, where sellers must disclose information to buyers, or 
themselves risk liability, disclosure on the brokers' part would only 
help assure that the sellers fulfilled their own duty to buyers. 295 
Imposing this real estate broker-duty in negligence does not mean 
that it is solely the broker's obligation to discover toxic contamina-
tion. Rather, this duty adds another capable professional to the list 
of those already working to locate and clean up environmental con-
tamination. 296 Requiring brokers to investigate would make it more 
difficult to sell contaminated property. This difficulty, in turn, will 
eventually lead to greater awareness on everyone's part, of the 
existence of toxic pollution and the problems it engenders. 
If other states do not follow the lead of California, New Mexico, 
and Utah and adopt the Easton standard of care, however, buyers 
may only hold brokers responsible in fraud or nondisclosure for 
concealing defects about which the brokers already knew or had an 
inkling,297 or in negligent misrepresentation for negligently convey-
ing false information about known defects. 298 The buyers would not 
be able to hold brokers liable for failing to disclose information about 
which the brokers should have known independent of what the seller 
knew or what the buyer asked. 299 Where the signs of contamination 
are tangible, are easily meaningful to competent real estate bro-
kers,30o and are material to buyers and to the public,301 failing to 
hold brokers responsible would serve as a "disincentive"302 to in-
292 Reply Brief for Respondents at 6-7, Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 
Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) (No. A010566); see Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735, 29 
Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05 (1963) (seller has duty to disclose). 
293 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
294 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of California Association of Realtor at 11, Easton (No. A010566). 
295 Reply Brief for Respondents at 6-7, Easton (No. AOl0566). 
296 See supra notes 6, 289-90 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra notes 73-109. 
298 See supra notes 110-36 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 73-136. 
:JOO See supra notes 239-62 and accompanying text. 
:l01 See supra notes 92, 290 and accompanying text. 
302 Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388 (1984). 
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specting the property for toxins. When brokers are not required to 
inspect independently for defects, they are allowed to remain "ig-
norant of that which [they hold themselves] out to know."303 In the 
face of the large body of legislation reflecting a public policy to 
identify and clean up contamination,304 failure to hold real estate 
brokers liable in negligence only frustrates the important national 
goal. 
A further policy justification for the Easton negligence standard 
lies in the rationale for finding a broker fiduciary duty to purchas-
ers. 305 As between the real estate broker and the buyer, the former 
is in a better position to discover signs of potential toxic contami-
nation. 306 The courts recognize that brokers know more about real 
estate matters than do unsophisticated residential purchasers. 307 The 
two parties do not have access to the same information: brokers have 
had time to review the property, or the listing, or to talk to the 
sellers; they know the history of the neighborhood; in comparison, 
this may be the buyer's first real-estate transaction. Therefore, 
where the two parties are not on equal footing, courts have held 
that the buyer is justified in relying on the broker's statements about 
the property.308 The clear implication is that these courts recognize 
that, by virtue of their superior expertise, brokers not only possess 
certain facts, but also have access to important information if they 
seek it. To protect themselves, brokers should investigate the prop-
erty and relay the truth. As an incidental advantage, brokers may 
also serve sellers, their principals, by aiding sellers in fulfilling their 
own duties of disclosure to buyers. 
Finally, in those states where a standard of care and performance 
is embodied in the licensing statute, brokers owe a duty to the public 
to act reasonably, honestly, and competently.309 Full and truthful 
disclosure is necessary both to avoid defrauding the purchasing pub-
lic, and to clean up the environment. Brokers already have a duty 
to disclose what they know; to require them to disclose what they 
ought to know is hardly a new duty. This, coupled with the goal of 
protecting the environment set forth in the preamble to the National 
303 Id. 
304 See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text. 
306 Id. 
307 See supra notes 44-49, 171-78 and accompanying text. 
308 Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). See also supra notes 33-38, 130-37 
and accompanying text. 
309 See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text. 
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Association of Realtors Code of Ethics, implies that their public 
responsibility necessarily includes doing what brokers can, while 
being held to the level of knowledge necessary to be licensed, to 
further the national objective of combatting environmental contam-
ination. Because this standard of care represents no significant de-
parture from the standard already imposed either from a legal or 
practical point of view,310 it behooves those states that want to 
identify and clean up contamination to adopt the Easton court's 
standard of care in simple negligence. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Given today's possibility of pollution from innumerable sources, 
innocent purchasers may find themselves the owners of contaminated 
property. Research revealed no reported cases in which a buyer of 
residential real estate sued the seller's real estate broker in negli-
gence for the sale of previously contaminated land. In only three 
jurisdictions is a real estate broker liable in simple negligence to 
purchasers for failing independently to inspect and disclose signs of 
defects. This Comment advocates that other states should adopt this 
duty enunciated in the Easton, Gouveia, and Secor decisions. Be-
cause there is already strong precedent for the standard of care in 
simple negligence,311 and its adoption would not impose any addi-
tional burden on real estate brokers,312 this standard would not 
represent a significant departure from the responsibilities already 
required of real estate brokers. In recognition of the demonstrated 
national concern for the identification and cleanup of environmental 
pollution, a negligence standard provides the most effective incentive 
for brokers to do their part to further this goal. Negligence supplies 
a vehicle for holding real estate brokers liable to buyers for failing 
to investigate reasonably and diligently for the buyer's benefit and 
disclose red flags that may indicate the presence of toxic contami-
nation on the sale property. 
310 See supra notes 134--37, 220-65 and accompanying text. 
311 Id. 
:HZ Id. 
